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Ghura analyzed the immediate, delayed, and  tion, while prices on most energy products and
group responses of 20 commodity prices in four  aU  crops appreciated. Most of the significant
commodity groups (foods and livestock, crops,  inmmediate  impacts of exchange rate shocks were
energy, and metals) to macroeconomic "news"  positive.
(unexpected announcements) in the United
States between 1985 and 1989. He found that:  It was a different story with the one-day-
lagged effect of exchange rate shocks.  The
Macroeconomic news generally affects  delayed effect was positive for metals, foods and
commodities within groups in the same direction  livestock, crops and oilseeds, but negative for
- but there is no clear evidence that the prices  energy products.
of largely unrelated commodity groups react in
the same way to macroeconomic shocks.  The significant immediate impact of interest
rate shocks was positive, as expected.  The one-
News about inflation indices and the money  day-lagged effect was negative, except for
supply did not have a major effect on commodity  metals, for which it was positive.
pnces.
News about real activity was important,
The business cycle must be carefully consid-  especially during the local recession.  Several
ered in analyzing the impact of macroeconomic  commodities were sluggish in their reaction to
news on commodity prices.  Over the long haul,  such news, however.  Most  crops and energy
news about macroeconomic variables was  products reacted with a one-day lag - but the
unimportant - but many commodities reacted  response of soybeans, soybean products, and
significantly to news when the economy was  wheat was positive and the response of energy
coming out of a local recession (October I to  products was negative.
December 31, 1987). When indices of real
activity were sending out "noisy" signals, most  [Method:  Ghura used survey data to meas-
commodities did not respond significantly to  ure the effect of news about macroeconomic
news.  variables that are announced periodically
(money stock, inflation, and indices of real
During the recession, unexpected move-  activity).  He used autoregressions to measure
ments in exchange rates appeared to affect the  shocks to commodity markets for variables
behavior of metal prices, both immediately and  (exchange rates and interest rates) whose values
after a delay.  are realized on financial and credit markets.]
The prices of metals and foods and livestock
commodities fell after exchange rate apprecia-
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1.  There has been great interest  over the past 15 years in the
theoreticel  and empirical  linkages  between  macroeconomic  variables  (including
exchange rates) and commodity  markets [Bond (1984);  Batten  and Belongia
(1986);  Belongia  and King (1983);  Chambers  (1981,  1984,  1985);  Chambers  and
Just (1979, 1981, 1982);  Gardner (1981);  Grennes  and Lapp (1986);  Orden
(1986);  Rauser  et. al. (1986);  and  Schuh  (1974)]. There  is now  an emerging
literature  on the  impact  of macroeconomic  shocks  on short-run  commodity  price
behavior.  [Barnhart (1988, 1989); Frankel (1984, 1986); Frankel and
Hardouvelis  (1985);  Gilbert  (1985,  1987)]
2.  The  studies by  Bond, Frankel (1986), Frankel and  Hardouvelis
(henceforth,  PH), and  Gilbert (1985) emphasized  the  important  role of
expectations  about macroeconomic  variables in  short-run  commodity  price
dynamics. Primary  storable  commodities  are  viewed  as financial  assets  since
they are traded  continuously  on futures  exchanges.  Hence,  the short-run
prices  of these  commodities  are  expected  to be influenced  not  only  by market
demand  and supply  conditions  (market  fundamentals),  but  also  by "news"  1/ of
macroeconomic  variables  2/ (such as money stock;  interest,  inflation  and
exchange  rates;  and real  activity  indices),  which  affect  the  terms  on which
traders  are  prepared  to hold  title  to  commodity  futures  contracts.
1/ News  refers  to  unpredictable  new  information.
2/  Of course,  commodity  prices  and  especially  prices  of agricultural  goods
are influenced  not only by news  of macroeconomic  variables,  but  also by
news  about  the  weather  and  a host  of  other  non-economic  factors.3.  PH investigated  the  theoretical  and  empirical  behavior  of commodity
prices prior to and following  money supply  announcements  by the Federal
Reserve  System  of the  United  States  (henceforth,  Fed).  Barnhart  extended  the
empirical  approach  taken  by PH to cover  the  prices  of more commodities  and
more U.S. macroeconomic  announcements.  These studies have shown that
co_mmodity  prices  have  responded  significantly  to news  over  the  period  1977  to
1984  and  that  these  responses  have  been  particularly  sensitive  to the  monetary
policy  regimes  adopted  by  the  Fed.
4.  However, the studies by PH  and Barnhart  disregarded  the price
movements  on  days  when  no  announcements  were  made.  Presumably,  daily
comodity  prices  are  affected  by  other  measurable  economic  shocks.  Also,  a
major limitation  of these studies  is that despite  the importance  of the
interlinkages  between  international  financial  and  primary  comodity  markets
(Chambers  and Just; Gilbert;  Schuh),  they ignored  any possible  comodity
market  reactions  to daily  shocks  from  foreign  exchange  markets.  1/  Gilbert
(1985)  provided  the  theoretical  interlinkages  between  exchange  rate  shocks  and
comodity  price  movements.  His  empirical  investigation  (Cilbert,  1987)
analysed  quarterly  movements  of metal prices  as explained  by shocks  in
quarterly  exchange  rates. Although  his  analysis  was  an important  contribution
to understanding  the impact  of exchange  rate  shocks  on commodity  prices,  it
masked  the important  impact  of daily  exchange  rate  shocks  and periodic  U.S.
macroeconomic  ainouncements  on  daily  commodity  price  movements.  Finally,
1I/  Barnhart  (1989)  recognizes  the importance  of exchange  rate shocks  in
commodity  price  dynamics.  However,  he  chooses  to  ignore  it  in  his
analysis.-3-
another  limitation  of the previous  studies  is that  they  assume  the  responses
of commodity  prices  to  news  are  the  same  over  different  stages  of the  business
cyccl..
S.  This paper  coatributes  to the  existing  literature  on the impact  of
macroeconomic  shocks  on commodity  prices  in a number  of ways. First,  the
respenses  of commodity  prices  to economic  news are allowed  to vary over
different  stages  of the  business  cycle. Second,  it  analyzes  the  simultaneous
impacts  of  news  from  U.S.  macroeconomic  announcements  and  surprises  from  daily
exchange  and interest  rate  shocks  on daily  c;  aodity  price  movements.  For
economic  variables  which  are announced  periodically  (money  stock,  inflation
and real activity  indices),  survey  data are used to divide  macroeconomic
announcements  into expected  and  unexpected  components,  with the  latter
measuring  news.  For  other  independent  variables  whose  values  are  realized  on
financial and  credit  markets  (exchange rates  and  interest rates),
autoregressions  are  used  to  model  their  daily  behavior  and  the  residuals  from
these autoregressions  are  taken to  be  exogeneous  shocks to  commodity
markets.  Third, recent data (01/02/85-05/31/89)  are used. All existing
studies  analyning  the impact  of economic  shocks  on short-run  coamodity  price
behavior  have used data that date from the late seventies  to the early
eighties. Fourth,  the  price  behavior  of important  commoditi.s  (e.g.  energy
products)  not  considered  by  the  existing  studies  are  analyzed.
6.  The  important  role of  exchange  rate fluctuations  in  short-run
commodity  price  dynamics  cannot  be  ignored.  The  association  of movements  in
daily commodity futures prices with movements in  the  U.S. dollar  is- 4  -
comonplace in the  media. The international  economy  has  experienced  several
major  developments  in the value  of the  dollar  over the past 15 years.  The
dollar  fell  to a historically  low  level  ii.  the  late  1970's,  but  rose  sharply
over the period  1982-84. The  U.S. farm  economy  was  deeply  affected  by the
persistent  overvaluation  of the dollar  as consumers  and producers  in other
countries found prices of  U.S. agricultural  commodities  more expensive
expressed  in terms  of foreign  currencies. By the beginning  of 1985, the
.Z  %,  was generally  considered  h,ghly  overvalued.  Since  then  there  has  been
a &uustantial  depreciation.  1/
7.  The rest  of this  paper  is organized  as follows. Section  II gives  a
brief survey  of the published  work on the reaction  of commodity  prices  to
economic  announcements  and other  news.  Then,  in Section  III  the  theoretical
framework and  theoretical  considerations  are discussed.  The  data are
described  in  Section  IV. The  empirical  model  and  results  are  given  in  Section
V.  Finally,  Section  VI provides  concluding  remarks.
1/  Se,.  figure  3.- 5  -
II. SURVEY  OF LITERATURE
8.  Although  many studies  1/  have investigated  the reactions  of various
rates,  yields,  and  asset  prices  to macroeconomic  announcements  over the  past
15 years, it is only recently  that the reaction  of commodity  prices  to
economic  news has been investigated.  In an invited  address  to the  American
Agricultural  Economics  Association  annual  meetings  in August 1984,  Frankel
(1984)  noted the importance  of economic  news in affecting  the prices  of
storable  comodities.  He argued  that  "An  implication  of the  hypothesis  that
markets are  efficient  is the: spot and futures prices  will react when
information  on  relevant  economic  variables  is  released  to  the  public,  but  only
to the extent that the variable  deviates  from what had previously  been
expected."
9.  The  first  reported  theoretical  and  empirical  work  on the  reaction  of
commodity  prices  to  unanticipated  money  growth  was  conducted  by PH.  In  their
theoretical  development,  they  derived  an equation  relating  price  changes  in
storable  commodities  to weekly  unanticipated  monetary  shocks.  They showed
that to get a negative  relationship  between  price  movements  and unexpected
money  stock  changes,  it  is  not  sufficient  for  the  change  in  money  supply  to be
transitory. It is also necessary  that investors  perceive  changes  in money
demand (caused,  for instance,  by  changes  in real income) to be partly
permanent. They  emphasized  that  only  the  unanticipated  component  of the  money
1/ See Pearce  (1988)  for  a survey  of  -the  theoretical  and  empirical  work on
the  impact  of  news  on  exchange  rates. See  Hardouvelis  (1988)  for  evidence
on the  reaction  of  interest  rates  to  economic  news.stock  announcements  should  matter. If  markets  are  efficient,  the  anticipated
part  of the  announcement  will  already  have  been  reflected  in  futures  prices.
10.  In their  empirical  analysis,  PH considered  the reaction  of Friday
"closed"  to  Monday  "open"  price  quotations  of  nine  commodities  to  Friday  money
announcements.  1/  They divided  their  sample  into two sub-periods  2/ to
analyze  the  impact  of  monetary  shocks  on commodity  prices  under  two  different
monetary  policy  regimes  of the  Fed.  In  the  first  sub-period,  they  found  that
except  for  a significant  positive  reaction  of cocoa  prices  to  positive  money
shocks,  commodity  prices  did  not react  significantly.  They  interpreted  this
result  to mean that  markets  did not  have faith  in the  Fed's  commitments  to
achieve its pronounced  yearly  money growth  targets,  i.e.,  positive  money
surprises  were  interpreted  as indicating  more  of the  same  in  the  future.
11.  In the second  sub-period,  they found that four of the commodity
prices  reacted  negatively  to  positive  money  surprises.  The  nine  commodities
1/  The period  analyzed  was 11/03/78-11/05/82.  In that period  the Fed  was
announcing  money  supply  on  Friday  afternoons.  The  commodities  consider,.
were gold, silver, sugar, cocoa, cattle, feeders,  wheat, corn and
soybeans.
2/  These  two  sub-periods  correspond  to  two  different  monetary  regimes  of the
Fed.  In the first  sub-period  (11/03/78-10/05/79),.  the  Fed targeted  the
federal  funds  rate. Prior  to  October  6, 1979,  the  Fed  accommodated  shifts
in  money  demand  so  that  interest  rate  fluctuations  were  smoothed  and  money
supply  was not closely  controlled. In the  second  sub-period  (10/06/79-
11/05/82',  emphasis  was put on monetary  aggregates  (e.g.  non-b.rrowed
reserves).  In  that  period,  the  growth  rate  of  narrowly  defined  money  (Ml)
was controlled  closely  and wider fluctuations  for interest  rates were
tolerated.-7-
as  a  group  had  a significant  negative  reaction  to  positive  money  shocks. They
attributed  this  finding  to the fact  that  markets  had  confidence  in the  Fed's
commitments  to stick  to a monetary  growth  rate  for  Ml.  That is,  speculators
believed  that  high  money  growth  rates  in period  t would  be offset  by  monetary
contraction  in period  t+1,  causing  inflationary  expectations  to  go down,  real
rates to go up, bonds to become  more attractive  and commodity  futures
contracts  to be less  attractive. They  also found  some  delayed  reaction  of
prices  to  monetary  shocks  and  attributed  it  to  market  inefficiency.
12.  In a theoretical  piece,  Featnkel  (1986),  focused  on the impact  of
monetary  disturbances  on prices  of storable  commodities. His model  was a
direct  application  of the Dornbusch  overshooting  model in which  commodity
prices  were substituted  for  prices  of foreign  currencies.  Prankel  argued  that
monetary  policy  has an impact  on real agricultural  commodity  prices  even
though the  latter are flexible,  because the prices of other goods are
sticky.  For instance,  since  an unexpected  increase  in the nominal  money
supply  is an increase  in the  real  money  supply  in the  short-run,  there  is a
decrease  in  the  real  interest  rate  which  in turn  causes  real  commodity  prices
to appreciate. However,  since  commodities  are storable,  they  are  subject  to
the  arbitrage  condition  that  the  expected  rate  of  change  in  their  prices  minus
storage  costs  must be equal  to the short-term  nterest  rates.  Given this
condition,  commodity  prices  must  rise  today  and  by  more  than  the  proportion  by
which  they are  expected  to rise  in the  long-run. That  is,  commodity  prices
overshoot  their  new  long-run  equilibrium  in  order  to  generate  expectations  of
future  depreciations  sufficient  to  offset  the  lower  interest  rate.13.  Barnhart  (1988,  1989)  made  important  empirical  contributions  to this
literature  by extending  the  emiArical  approach  taken  by  PH  to  account  for  more
comodities 1/  and  announcements.  In  his 1988  article,  Barnhart  analyzed  the
resition  of comodity prices  to  macroeconomic  announcements  2/ under  different
monetary  regimes  of the  Fed  in  an  attempt  to  distinguish  between  two  competing
theories  of price  movements  --  namely  the  "policy  anticipation  hypothesis"  and
the "inflationary  expectations  hypothesis."  3/  He divided  his sample  into
three  sub-periods  4/ to do so.  The  results  conform  with  those  of PH.  That
is, no significant  reaction  of commodity  prices  to unanticipated  money  was
observed  in  the  first  sub-period.  Also,  in  general,  most  of the  news  elements
considered  did not  matter  much in explaining  commodity  price  movements. In
the  second  sub-period,  most of the significant  negative  reactions  were from
unanticipated  monetary  variables  including  money,  and  discount  and surcharge
rates.  Therefore,  Barnhart's  results  conform  with the predictions  of the
policy  anticipation  hypothesis.
1/  The commodities  were barley,  cattle,  cocoa,  coffee,  copper,  corn,  gold,
hogs, lumber,  oats,  silver,  soybeans,  soymeal,  soyoil  and wheat.  The
dependent  variables  were  calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  close  or
open prices  prior  to the announcements  or to the  open or close  prices
following  the  announcements.
2/  These  were  announcements  on discount  rates,  surcharge  rates,  money  stocks,
inflation  rates,  unemployment  rates  and  industrial  production.
3/  See  Section  III  under  "Impact  of  Money  Surprises"  for  an  explanation.
4/  The period of analysis  is 10/06177-12/28/84.  The three sub-periods
correspond  to three  different  monetary  regimes  of the  Fed. The  first  two
sub-periods  correspond  to those  of PH and are subject  to the  monetary
policies  described  in footnote  2, page 7.  In the third sub-period
(10/06/82-12/28/84),  the  Fed  returned  to  its  pre-October  1979  target.-9-
14.  However,  in the third  sub-sample  period,  Barnhart  found  significant
negative  reactions  of  commodity  prices  to  unanticipated  money  but  no reaction
to unanticipated  discount  rate changes. This result  is puzzling  given the
fact  that the  Fed  did  not  have  any  specific  target  for  MI in  that  period  and
was  targeting  the federal funds rate.  Barnhart  also found significant
positive  reactions  of commodity  prices  to unanticipated  surges  in economic
activity  in the  third  sub-period.
15.  In  analyzing  the  whole  sampl1,  Barnhart  found  that  six of the
commodities  reacted  significantly  to  both  discount  and  surcharge  rate
surprises,  while ten  commodities  reacted  significantly  to money  supply
announcements.  These  reactions  were  all  predominantly  negative.  Furthermore,
he found  a significant  delayed  reaction  to several  of the  news  components  and
like  FH  attributed  it  to  market  inefficiency.
16.  Barnhar.'s  1989  article  was  an  extenLion  of  his  1988  article; in  the
latter  paper  he  considers  the  same  commodities  with  a  few  more  announcements
over the  period  2/15/80-12/28/84.  Several  of the news  elements  considered
(e.g.,  consumer  installment  credit,  manufacturers'  orders  for  durable  goods,
housing  starts,  retail  sales  and  the  trade  deficit)  are  not  predicted  by the
theory  1/.  However,  it is possible  that  surprises  in these  variables  might
indirectly  affect  the  terms  on  which  speculators  hold  contracts  to  commodities
1/  Only news from  the credit  market  (interest  rates),  the foreign  exchange
market,  real activity,  inflation,  and money stock  are predicted  by the
theory.  See  Cilbert  (1985,  1987)  for  a discussion  of the  first  four  news
components  and  how  they  affect  commodity  prices. Frankel  and  Hardouvelis
(1985)  discuss the theoretical  links between  unanticipated  money and
comodity prices.- 10  -
and  hence  affect  their  prices. Barnhart  found  that  the  news  contained  in  the
variables  not predicted  by theory  are not generally  important  in affecting
prices. As in  his  earlier  study  Barnhart  found  that  surprises  in  the  monetary
variables (MI, discount  and surcharge  rates)  cause the majority of  the
significant  comnodity  price  responses  following  announcements.
17.  Gilbert  (1985)  derived  the  theoretical  links  between  commodity  price
changes  and innovations  in interest  rates,  exchange  rates  and inflation,  and
between  innovations  in  expected  supply  and  demand  for  the  commodity  over  the
period  during  which  stocks  are  to  be  held.  The main  contribution  of  Gilbert's
work  is  on  the  theoretical  linkage  between  exchange  rate  shocks  and  commodity
prices.  His model predicts  that an unexpected  appreciation  in the dollar
results  in a less-than-proportional  fall  in the  dollar  price  of commodities
(as  a weighted  average  of the  exchange  rate  changes,  where  the  weights  depend
on  production  and  consumption  shares  and  supply  and  demand  elasticities).  The
predictions  of the other  variables  of his model  are discussed  in the next
Section.
18.  In  his 1987  article,  Gilbert  used  quarterly  data on  metal  1/  prices
to  verify  the  predictions  of  his  1985  theoretical  article.  He  measured  news
1/  These  were  prices  of  aluminum,  copper,  lead,  nickel,  silver,  tin,  and  zinc
from  the  London  Metal  Exchange. The sample  covered  the  period  1978ql  to
1985q4.- 11 -
in exchange  rates,  1/ interest  rates,  inflation  and real  activity  by taking
the  residuals  from  autoregressions  on quarterly  data.  Prices  were found  to
respond  to exchange  rate surprises  as predicted  by the theory.  That is,
prices  tend to appreciate  with unexpected  depreciations  of the  dollar,  and
vice versa.  However,  it was found  that the interest,  inflation  and real
activity  innovation  effects  were relatively  poorly  defined.  This may have
been  due to the fact  that  the  measurement  of  news  was  too  crude  and  that  use
of  quarterly  data  effectively  masked  any  news  element. It  was  also  concluded
that there was  evidence  of weak-form  inefficiency  in  the London Metal
Exchange. This  result  concurs  with  findings  by Barnhart  (1988)  and  PH.
1/  Exchange  rates  were measured  as a CNP-weighted  index  of OECD countries
exchange  rates  with  respect  to the  U.S.  dollar. Interest  rates  were  the
U.S. Treasury bill rate. Industrial  production  (to account for real
activity)  and  inflation  rates  were  weighted  indexes  of  OECD  countries.- 12  -
III.  THEORETICAL  CONSIDERATIONS
19.  In this  section,  a simple  model  is  developed  to  explain  the  impact  of
new  information  on  commodity  prices.  Following  the  specification,  the
theoretical  links  between  daily  comodity price  movements  and  new information
about  daily  movements  in exchange  and  interest  rates,  weekly  announcements  of
the money stock,  and monthly  announcements  of inflation  and real activity
indices  are  discussed.
20.  The  main  motivations  for  a trader  to  hold  commodity  futures  contracts
in a  portfolio  with other liquid  assets  (such as stocks,  bonds,  foreign
currencies,  and money)  are for  diversification,  risk  minimization  and short-
run profit  maximization. Any unexpected  new information  which  affects  the
trader's  perceptions  of the future  time  path  of his net  profit  flow  on that
portfolio  will make him revise  the proportion  of each asset held.  Such
reshuffling  will  cause commodity prices to  change accordingly,  either
temporarily  or  permanently. Hence,  news results  in the revision  of the
dynamic  paths  of commodity  prices.
The  Model
21.  The  efficient  markets hypothesis  attributes  daily movements of
financial  asset  prices  to news  about  fundamental  economic  variables. Hence,
the  analysis  is  set  in  an  efficient  market  framework  where- 13  -
DPj(t) - a  +  DUZ(t)B  +  u(t)  (1)
and
DPi(t)  - percentage  change  in the  i-th  commodity  futures  price  from
the  close  of  trading  on  day  t-l  to  the  ciose  of trading  on  day
t;
DUZ(t)  - unexpected  percentage  change  in economic  data  contained  in
vector  Z(t),  computed  as the  difference  between  announced  or
realized values  and  expected values,  =  (ln[AZ(t)l -
ln[EZ(t)  )*100;
DEZ(t)  =  expected  percentage  change  of variables  in vector  Z(t)
(ln[EZ(t)I  - ln[AZ(t-l)J)*100;
AZ(t)  - annnounced  or  realized  values  of  variables  in  vector  Z(t);
EZ(t)  =  expected  values  of  variables  in  vector  Z(t);
Z(t)  - vector  containing  the following  variables:  money supply;
interest, unemployment and  exchange  rates;  industrial
production  and  inflation  indices;
u(t)  =  random  disturbance  1/ term with zero mean and constant
variance;
and
B is a vector  of parameters  and a is a scalar  parameter  intended  for
estimation.
If expectations  are  rational,
UZ(t)  =  AZ(t) - B[Z(t)/I(t-1)),  (2)
where  UZ(t)  is the  unexpected  values  of  variables  in  vector  Z(t),  AZ(t)  is  as
defined  before,  e  is  the expectation  operator  and I(t-l)  is the  information
set  available  at time (t-l). If markets  are  efficient,  only  the  unexpected
part of any economic  announcement  or realized  values  of economic  variables
1/  It is  assumed  that  u(t)  is  uncorrelated  with  information  known  as of  the
close  of trading  on  day  t-l.- 14  -
should  cause prices  to change.  Events  which  are expected,  presumably  are
built into the  forecast  process  by rational  economic  agents. Economic  news
alters agents'  expectations  about the future  course  of economic  variables
which  in  turn  changes  prices  of commodities.
Impact  of Money  Surprises
22.  The first  category  of economic  news  considered  here  is contained  in
weekly  announcements  of U.S. money  supply.  Although  it is widely  accepted
that monetary  policy  is neutral  with respect  to coamodity  prices  over the
long-run  1/, it is not so  obvious  that  monetary  shocks  are  neutral  over  the
short-run.  2/
23.  According  to the policy  anticipation  hypothesis  about  how weekly
money stock announcements  influence  commodity  prices,  speculators  in the
commodity  markets  believe  that  the  unexpected  money  growth  in  period  t  will  be
offset  in period  t+l  as the  Fed  restricts  the  money  supply,  driving  up real
interest  rates. A rise  in  real  rates  will  lead  to  a fall  in  commodity  prices
as investors  make  a portfolio  adjustment  to  hold  more  money  and  fewer  physical
assets. By contrast,  the  expected  inflation  hypothesis  assumes  that  the  Fed
will  not offset  increases  in the  money  stock  but  will  keep  on increasing  the
1/  See  Crennes  and  Lapp  (1986),  for  instance.
2/  Results  from Frankel  and Hardouvelis  (1985)  and Barnhart  (1988,  1989)
point  to  the  importance  of  monetary  shocks  for  short-run  commodity  price
behavior. However,  the  impact  of  monetary  shocks  is  very  sensitive  to the
operating  procedure  of  the  Fed.- 15  -
money supply,  resulting  in higher  inflation  expectations. In this case,
comodity futures  contracts  become  attractive  as investors  move out  of money
and decide  to hold more  physical  assets  such  as stocks,  foreign  currencies,
and  comodity futures.
24.  As  described  earlier,  since the late seventies,  at  least four
different  operating  procedures  appear  to  have  been  used  by the  Fed. If  these
descriptions  of the changes in the Fed's monetary  policies  are correct,
comodity prices  should  not have  reacted  to unanticipated  money  in the pre-
October  1979  and post-October  1982  periods  and depreciated  after  a posiLtive
money  shock  in  the  October  1979  to  October  1982  period.  Both  FH and  Barnhart
(1988)  have  found  this  to  be  the  case  for  the  period  1977-1982.  Also,
Barnhart  found  that  several  commodities  reacted  negatively  to  positive  shockv
in  MI  in  the  post-October  1982  period  when  the  Fed  was  operating  under  a
borrowed  reserve  policy  regime.
25.  In  the  mid-eighties,  the  Fed  has  apparently  stopped  targeting  growth
rates  for its monetary  aggregates,  although  it seems  that  it has been more
interested  in setting  target  rates  for M2 and M3 rather  than  for M1.  The
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin (December  1985)  states  that  "...  adjustment  should
not be made automatically  in  response  to the  behavior  of  mone tary  aggregates
alone, but should take broader economic  and financial  developments  into
account, including conditions in  domestic and  international  financial
markets." The  factors  that  are  now  apparently  taken  into  consideration  in  the
conduct of U.S. monetary  policy are:  behavior  of monetary  aggregates;
strength  of the  business  expansion;  performance  of the  dollar  in the  foreign- 16  -
exchange  markets;  progress  against  inflation;  and  conditions  in domestic  and
international  markets. Given  this,  unexpected  movements  in MI alone  are no
longer  a good guide to future  monetary  policy  and should  not have caused
commodity  prices  to react  significantly  in  the  period  01/02/85-05/31/89.
Impact  of Inflation  Surprises
26.  The second  category  of news  considered  is from  monthly  announcements
of the Producer  Price  Index  (PPI)  and the Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI).  The
linkage between unexpected  inflation  and daily comodity price movements
depends on  how  investors  interpret  the news in regard to  inflationary
expectations  and in regard  to how they expect the Fed tn react to the
inflation  figures. If  the  announcements  activate  a fear  of  renewed  inflation,
investors  move  out  of  money  and  into  physical  assets. Thus,  they  demand  more
commodity  futures  contracts,  causing  commodity  prices  to rise.  If, however,
speculators  believe  that  the  Fed  will  resort  to  a restrictive  monetary  policy
due  to  the  unexpected  increase  in  inflation,  causing  nominal  interest  rates  to
rise in excess  of expected  inflation,  real interest  rates  should  rise.  In
this case, investors  will adjust their portfolio by  selling commodity
contracts,  stocks,  and foreign  currencies  and  by holding  more  money. Hence,
commodity  prices  would  be  expected  to fall.
Impact  of  Real  Activity  Surprises
27.  The  third  category  of  news  considered  is  from  the  announcements  about
real economic  variables  - industrial  production  and unemployment  rates.- 17  -
Unexpected  economic  growth  as  manifested  by  an  unexpected  increase  in
industrial  output  and/or  a decline  in  unemployment  could  be expected  to  have
ambiguous  effects  on commodity  price  growth  rateai  since  this  "good"  news  can
be viewed  by investors  in two  ways--depending  in part on the stage  of the
economic  cycle.  First,  news of a strenghtening  of economic  activity  may
increase  investors'  confidence  about  future  growth  in  the  economy. In such  a
case,  investors  will increase  their  demand  for  short-run  investments  causing
short-term  nominal  and  hence  real  interest  rates  to rise (assuming  inflation
expections  do not  change). Again,  comodity prices  would  be  expected  to  fall
for  reasons  discussed  earlier.  On the  other  hand,  investors  might  interpret
the  strengthening  of  economic  activity  as  a  sign of an  "overheating"
economy.  There  are two  possible  price  reactions  in this  case.  If traders
expect  the  Fed to react  by contracting  money  supply,  real  rates  should  go up
and hence  commodity  prices  fall.  However,  if traders  believe  that  the Fed
will remain  passive  and hence  increase  their  inflationary  expectations,  real
interest  rates are supposed  to fall causing  commodity  prices  to rise as
investors  demand  more  commodity  contracts.  Therefore,  the  overall  impact  of
news of real activity  is ambiguous  and can only  be determined  empirically.
Moreover,  the  stage  of the  cycle  may  affect  the  reaction  to  news  about  other
macroeconomic  variables.
Impact  of Interest  Rate  Surprises
28.  The impact  of a surprise  in  nominal  interest  rates  is  also  ambiguous
with respect  to commodity  prices  since  it  depends  on the  extent  to which  the
surprise  in the  nominal  rate  reflects  a real  rate  surprise  and  the  extent  to- 18  -
which investors  perceive  the Fed to smooth  interest  rate swings.  If a
positive  nominal rate shock is in excess  of inflationary  expectations,  it
translates  into a positive  real rate shock  and commodity  prices  would be
expected  to fall for two important  reasons. First,  investors  adjust  their
portfolio  by holding  more money  and fever  commodity  contracts. Also, for
storable  comodities, real interest  rate surprises  1/ are important  since
interest  rates  are a major  cost  component  in  storage. An unexpected  rise  in
real l tes makes it more costly  to hold inventories. In the short-run,
traders  will get rid of their  inventories  and cut further  demand  for them.
This action  will,  in turn,  cause  commodity  prices  to fall.  Chambers  (1984,
1985)  provides  theoretical  evidence  for  this  reasoning.  However,  if  positive
nominal interest  rate shocks  are not in excess  of increases  in expected
inflation,  real  rates  fall  and  commodity  prices  rise. Also,  if  investors  have
any  reason  to  believe  that  the  Fed  might  smooth  out  interest  rate  swings  by
counteracting  wide  unanticipated  interest  rate  movements,  commodity  prices
might  react  in  one  direction  in  day  t  and  in  an  opposite  direction  in  day  t  +
1  to  shocks  occurring  in  day  t.  This  kind  of  behavior  is  observed.
1/  Barnhart  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the  important  impact  on  commodity
prices  of  unexpected  changes  in  announced  discount  rates.  The present
study  considers  the  impact  of  daily  interest  rate  surprises  on  commodity
markets.  In  this  way  one  can  capture  the  full  effect  of  surprises  from
the  credit  markets  on  the  commodity  markets.  Also,  a  higher  discount  rate
will  most  likely  translate  into  a  higher  market  rate  and  hence  the  impact
of  unexpected  changes  in  discount  rates  are  also  captured  in  this  way.- 19  -
Impact  of Exchange  Rate  Surprises
29.  The last category  of news considered  is  unexpected  exchange  rate
movements.  With the exception  of Gilbert  (1985,  1987),  no other  study  has
investigated  the impact  of economic  news from the international  economy  as
embodied,  say,  in  unexpected  movements  of exchange  rates  on  comodity  prices.
Kxchange  rate  fluctuations  appear  to  be  a  major  source  of  variability  in
comodity prices.  Gilbert  (1985),  in  the  context  of (i)  independence  of  price
expectations  of the courntry  in which these  expectations  are formad, (ii)
efficient  forward  exchange  markets,  (iii)  covered  interest  parity,  and  (iv)  no
transportation  costs,  developed  the theoretical  linkage  between commodity
price  movements  and  news from  the  foreign  exchange  markets. 7ne  implication
of  his  derivation  is  that  an  unexpected  one  percent  appreciation  of the  dollar
results  in a less  than  proportional  fall  in the  dollar  price  of commodities.
1/  Schuh has noted that U.S. agricultural  goods  lose their  international
competitiveness  when the dollar appreciates.  When the dollar gains in
strength,  U.S.  goods  become  more  expensive  in  terms  of foreign  currencies  and
foreign  demand  falls  causing  commodity  prices  to fall  in the  U.S.  Chambers
and Just (1981)  have shown  empirically  that  when the  dollar  is strong,  U.S.
prices  of soybeans,  wheat  and  corn  fall  significantly.  Also,  Orden,  using  a
Vector-Autoregressive  (VAR)  model,  has  shown  that  a  decline  in  the  real  value
of the  dollar  has  a positive  effect  on relative  agricultural  prices.
1/  The factor  of proportionality  in his  study  reflects  the  shares  in supply
and  demand of the various  producing  and consuming  countries  and the
magnitude  of  their  demand  and  supply  elasticities.- 20  -
IV.  DATA  AND  VARIABLE  SPECIFICATIOF'
30.  The data for  commodity  prices,  economic  announcements,  and  expected
values  of economic  announcements  are discussed  in this  section. The sample
period  begins  on January  2, 1985,  and  ends  on May  31, 1989.  Because  of the
important  role  of expectations,  the  expectations  data  are  discussed  in  detail.
Comodity Prices
31.  Table 1 gives a  suary  of the important  characteristics  of the
commodities  considered. Figures  4 to 23 show  the  monthly  movements  of the
comodity  prices used in this study.  To  investigate  the responses  of
comodity prices  to  new information,  daily  percentage  changes  in  closing  price
quotations  on "nearby"  futures  contracts  were  used. A nearby  is  a  continuous
price  series  for  a contract. Since  a futures  contract  stops  trading  on its
expiration  date, nearbys  were created  by "splicing"  individual  successive
futures  contracts  together. For example,  if a commodity  (e.g.  cotton)  had
contracts  that  matured  in  the  months  numbered  3 (March),  5 (May),  7 (July),  10
(October),  12 (December),  the  futures  prices  of the  contract  maturing  in  month
3  were  used  until  calender  month  3,  then  prices  of  contracts  maturing  in  month
5  were  used  until  calendar  month  5,  etc.  1/
1/ All cmrmodity  futures  price  data  are from  Data  Resoures,  The  McGraw-Hill
Financial  and  Economic  Information  Company,  Lexington,  Massachusetts.-21-
Announcement  Data
32.  The money  stock  data  consist  of announced  weekly  percentage  changes
in narrowly  defined  money  stock  (MS)  as reported  in the  Federal  Reserve  H.6
Statistical  Release.  1/  Since  March  22, 1984,  the  money  stock  announcements
have  been  made  on Thursdays  at 4:30  P.M.  (E.S.T.). The  Fed  announces  changes
in  the level  of the  money  stock  for  the  statement  week  ending  on  Wednesday  of
the previous  calender  week minus the revised  estimate  of the previously
reported  level  of the  money  stock.
33.  The data on inflation  are the monthly  percentage  changes  in the
producer  price  index  (PPI)  and  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI),  as announced  by
the Sureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS).  These  two figures  on inflation  are
released  at 8s30  a.m. once  every  month  on various  days of the week  and the
released  figures  provide  inflation  information  during  the  preceeding  month.
The  PPI announcement  is always  made  earlier  in  the  month  than  the  CPI
announcement  and  hence  it  may  contain  more  news  on  inflation  for  the
preceeding  month.  The  announced  figures  for  the  CPI  and  PPI  are  from  the  BLS
Press  Release.
34.  Data on industrial  production  (IP)  and unemployment  rate (UR)  are
used  to represent  information  on  real  economic  activity. Both  indicators  are
announced  monthly  on  various  days  of the  week  and  they  report  figures  for  the
previous  month.  The  figures  for  the  percentage  change  in  industrial
1/  The  narrowly  defined  money  stock  was  used in this  study  because  a survey
of expectations  data on M2 and M3 by MMS International  are available
starting  February  1988.- 22  -
production  are announced  by the  Fed  at 9:15 a.m.  They are reported  in the
Federal  Resurve  G.12.3  Statistical  Release.  The  unemployment  rate  figures  are
announced  by  the  BLS  at 8:30  a.m. They  are  reported  in  the  SLS  Press  Release.
35.  Great  care  was  taken  to  match  the  dates  of the  announcements  with  the
price  changes.  Since  money  announcements  are made  on  Thursday  afternoons
after  the  comodity  markets  are  closed,  the  unanticipated  component  of  money
announcements  were matched  with the  difference  between  the Friday  close  and
the Thursday  close  prices  to measure  the immediate  impact  of shocks  in the
money  supply  on coimodity  prices.  Also,  since  all  the  other  announcements  are
made while the markets are open, the unanticipated  components  of these
announcements  were matched  with the differences  between  the close of the
announcement  day and the close  of the  previous  day  to measure  the immediate
impact.
Expectations  and  Market  Data,  and  Economic  News
36.  For  those  variables  (MS,  PPI,  CPI,  IP,  UR)  for  which  regular
announcements  are  made,  market  expectations  data  were  used.  These
expectations  are  from  surveys  conducted  by  MMS  International,  Redwood  City,
California,  USA.  They  consist  of  median  responses  from  surveys  of
approximately  40 to 60 market  participants.  These  market  expectations  are
good  proxies  for  market  expectations  since  they  have  been  shown  to  be unbiased
and  efficient  (Pearce  and  Roley,  1985).
37.  The  unanticipated  component  of  the money supply  is  defined in
percentage  terms  as UMS(t)  =  ([MS(t)-(MS(t-l)  +  EIS(t))I/M(t-l))*l00,  where- 23  -
MS(t)  is  defined  above,  EKS(t)  is  the  survey  median  of the  expected  change  in
money  stock  from  the  previous  announcement  in  week  t-l  to the  present,  and  K
is  the  money  stock  level. The anticipated  component  of the  money  supply  is
calculated  as:  AM(t)  - [EMS(t)/M(t-l)I*l0O.
38.  The announced  percentage  change  in the UR (AUR)  is  calculated  as
([AUR(t)  - AUR(t-l)]/AUR(t-l))*lO0,  where  AUR(t)  is the announced  level  of
unemployment  in  period  t;  and  the  expected  percentage  change  in  the
unemployment  rate  (EUR)  is  calculated  as  follows: ([EUR(t)  - AUR(t-l)]/AUR(t-
1))*100,  where EiJR(t)  is the market  median  survey  of the  unemployment  rate
level  for  period  t.
39.  For other  announced  variables  used in this study (PPI,  CPI, IP),
since both the announced  and expected  figures  are themselves  in terms of
percentage  changes,  the  unexpected  percentage  changes  are calculated  as the
differences  between  the  announced  and  survey  expectations  figures.
40.  The  two  remaining  independent  variables  are:  the  unexpected  changes
in  daily  interest  rates  (IR)  and  exchange  rates  (ER).  The  interest  rate
chosen  is  the  three-month  U.S.  Treasury  bill  rate.  It  is  he  daily  average  as
reported  by the  U.S. Treasury. The exchange  rate is  defined  as the  London
noon  quotation  of the  number  of SDR  per  U.S.  dollar  as  reported  by  the  Bank  of
England.  1/  An increase  in  that  number  corresponds  to  an  appreciation  of the
dollar.  Both of these  rates  were  obtained  from  International  Monetary  Fund
1/  This  exchange  rate  is  chosen  for  two  important  reasons.  First,  in  terms
of  timing,  investors  in  the  U.S.  have  access  to  it  in  the  morning.
Second,  the  SDR/U.S.  dollar  rate  sunmarizes  the  movements  of a basket  of
important  international  currencies  vis-a-vis  the  U.S.  dollar.- 24  -
(IMF)  data tapes.  The daily  values  of these  two rates  are realized  in the
financial  markets  and  are  not  announced.  They  themselves  respond  to  economic
announcements  as shown  by Hardouvelis  (1988). However,  in this  study,  it is
assumed  that  unexpected  changes  in the  daily  interest  rate  and  exchange  rate
are  exogeneous  1/ to the  behavior  of commodity  prices. This  is  a reasonable
assumption  given the fact that these  rates  adjust  very quickly  to economic
announcements.  Hakkio  and  Pearce  (1985)  have  showni that  exchange  rates  adjust
to  economic  announcements  within  20 minutes,  while  Barnhart  and  PH have  shown
that commodity  prices  are somewhat  sluggish  in their  reaction  to economic
news.  Exchange  rate  and interest  rate surprises  have  been  calculated  as the
residuals  from second  order autoregressions  of the daily series  of these
rates.  2/
Business  Cycle  Data
41.  The business  cycle is measured  as the spread  between  the actual
natural  log  of industrial  production  and  the  trend  natural  log  of industrial
production. The trend  was found  by regressing  the actual  natural  log of
industrial  production  on  a  constant  and  a  time  index.  Results  of these
regressions  are shown  in Figures  1 and  2 for  the  periods  starting  in  January
1/  Empirical  analysis  of the impact  of unexpected  announcements  of money
stock, consumer, producer and  industrial  production indices, and
unemployment  rates  on the  residuals  from  autoregressions  of  daily  exchange
and  interest rates did  not  indicate any  statistically  significant
influence.  Hence,  this  assumption  is  justified.
2/  This  method  for  calculating  surprises  implicitly  assumes  that  agents  know
in period t the underlying  coefficients  of their  forecasting  model in
periods  tel, t+2, ....  However,  this procedure  is justified  if the
coefficients  of the  forecasting  models  have  not  changed  significantly  over
time. This  was  the  case.- 25  -
1980  and January  1985,  respectively.  The  data  on industrial  production  were
obtained  from  the  IMF  data  tapes  and  were  seasonably  adjusted.- 26  -
V.  EMPIRICAL  FRAMEWORK  AND  RESULTS
The  Empirical  Model
42.  The  empirical  equation  estimated  is
DPi(t)  = a  +  DWZ(t)B  +  LDUZ(t)C  + u(t)  (3)
where LDUZ(t) is the one-day-lagged  values  of the unexpected  percentage
changes  in economic  data  contained  in vector  Z(t),  C (like  B) is  a vector  of
parameters  intended  for  estimation,  and  all  other  variables  are  defined  as in
equation  (1).
Ceneral  Observations
43.  The  results  of  estimation  1/  of equation  (3)  are  given  in  Tables  2-5
for the whole period  (Table  2) and for sub-periods  2/ (Tables  3-5).  An
important  result  to  note  is  that  an analysis  of the  impact  of  macroeconomic
news over the whole period  (01/02/85-05/31/89)  reveals  that most commodity
prices did not react significantly  to news.  However,  the same analysis
conducted over sub-periods  suggests  that most commodity  prices reacted
1/ There is empirical  evidence  (see  Milanos,  1986,  for instance)  that the
first differences  of  commodity  prices have a  tendency to  exhibit
heteroskedasticity.  The results  given here are those obtained  after
correction  for  an unkaown  form  of  heteroskedasticity.
2/  The analysis  is conducted  by considering  each sub-period  separately  and
not  by  anal;,zing  the  whole  sample  and  using  dummy  variables  to  distinguish
different  phases  of the business  cycle,  because  it is assumed  that the
variances  of  the  econometric  models  for  the  different  sub-periods  are
different.- 27 -
significantly  to macroeconomic  news in the period  10/01/86-12/31/87  (period
two). In the  sub-periods  01102/85-09/30/86  (period  one)  and  01/02/88-05/31/89
(period  three)  there  was no significant  reaction  to macroeconomic  news for
virtually  all  comodities.
44.  Period two spans over 15 months  and exhibits  two important  and
distinguishing  features. First,  the  economy  was  rapidly  moving  out  of  a local
recession  which  had started  around  January  of 1986.  1/  Second,  there  was
virtually  no  mixed signals  from the real activity index of  industrial
production. However,  in the other  two sub-periods  the index  of industrial
production  was sending  out  noisy  signals  to investors,  sometimes  going  up  and
sometimes  going  down.
45.  Each of the coefficients  shown  in the Tables  (2-5)  represents  the
percentage  change  in  commodity  prices  following  a  one  percentage  unexpected
change  in  the  relevent  variable.  For  instance,  from  Table  4,  a  one  percent
appreciation  of  the  dollar  causes  the  price  of  cocoa  to  fall  by  six-tenths  of
a  percentage  point.  For  a  contract  representing  10  metric  tons  trading  at  one
dollar  per metric  ton, this corresponds  to an approzimate  decline  of six-
tenths  of one cent  which  translates  into  a depreciation  of about  6 cents  for
the value  of the contract.  The impact  of the other  variables  on commodity
prices  can  be  derived  in  a similar  way  by  using  the  information  given  in  Table
1.
1/  The phrase  "local  recession"  is used in the  mathematical  sense  here to
mean  a  recession  during  the  period  covered  in  this  study.  There  was a
more  pronounced  recession  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighties.- 28  -
46.  Three  F-statistics  are  given  in  Tables  2-5. The  F-statistic  F1  tests
the  null  hypothesis  that  the  impact  of all  the  included  variables  in  equation
(3)--variables  measuring  both the immediate  and the lagged  responses-is
jointly  equal  to  zero.  F2 tests  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  joint  impact  of
variables  (UMS,  UPPI,  UCPI,  UIP,  UUR,  UIR and UER)--measuring  the immediate
response-is  equal  to zero.  F3 tests  the  same  the  hypothesis  as F2 but for
the  variables  (LUMS,  LUPPI,  LUCPI,  LUIP,  LUUR,  LUIR  and  LUER)  which  measure
the  one-day-lagged  impact.
47.  Each variable  generally  affects  each commodity  within  a group in a
uniform  direction. However,  there  is no solid  evidence  that  economic  news
affects  largely  unrelated  commodity  groups  in a uniform  direction. Also,
several of  the commodities  reacted to news with delay, indicating  the
possibility  of market  inefficiency  in  commodity  markets. This  result  concurs
with  those  of Barnhart  (1988),  PH,  and  Gilbert  (1987).
Impact  of Exchange  Rate  Surprises
48.  It is clear from the results  that  news from the foreign  exchange
markets  is important  for  the  behavior  of daily  commodity  prices.  The  majority
of the  significant  immediate  impacts  of  unexpected  exchange  rate  appreciations
on  commodity prices are negative  and  are  of  particular  importance  in
explaining  the price  movements  of precious  metals,  cocoa,  and live  cattle.
The results  on the  direction  of the  immediate  impact  of exchange  rate  shocks
concur  both  with  theory  and  with  the  empirical  findings  of Gilbert  (1987)  for
quarterly  London  Metal  Exchange  metal  prices. Most of the significant  one-
day-lagged  impacts  of exchange  rate  news  are positive,  however. This result- 29  -
is  especially  true for period  two where all the significant  impacts of
positive  exchange  rate  shocks  are  positive.  This  result  is  puzzling  and  may
be  explained  by  the  expectation  that  there  might  be  intervention  by the  Fed  to
counteract  large  unexpected  swings  in  exchange  rates.
49.  It is also surprising  that  other  commodity  prices  such  as soybeans
and  corn  do not  respond  significantly  to  exchange  rate  movements.  This  may  be
due to the  exchange  rate  used (SDR/US$)  which  does  not  adequately  represent
the  exchange  rate  movements  of countries  which  compete  most  closely  with the
United  States  as consumers  or producers  of  these  commodities.
Impact  of  Interest  Rate  Surprises
50.  News  from  the  credit  markets,  as  reflected  by  unexpected  movements  in
the three-month  treasury  bill rate,  is also important  for explaining  the
behavior  of daily  commodity  price  movements  and  is  of  particular  importance  in
period  two.  News from the credit  markets  is of particular  importance  in
explaining  the price  movements  of crops,  soybeans  and soybean  products,  and
some  metals.  The  immediate  significant  impacts  for  most  commodity  prices  are
positive.  An implication  of  this  finding  is  that  nominal  interest  rate
variation  appears  to  be related  to  variations  in inflationary  expectations,  a
finding  supporting  the  view  advanced  by Fama  and  Cibbons  (1982).  1/
1/  Over the  period  when  the  Fed  was targeting  M[1,  however,  nominal  interest
rate variations  was related  more to real rate variations  and commodity
prices  should  have reacted  negatively  to positive  shocks  in the discount
rate. See  Barnhart  (1988)  for  a confirmation  of  this  result.- 30  -
51.  The strong  positive  immediate  reaction  of copper  prices  to positive
interest  rate  shocks  is  easy  to  explain.  A large  percentage  of the  demand  for
copper  is  for  industrial  use. However,  most  of the  significant  one-day-lagged
impacts  of positive  interest  rate  shocks  were  negative. Comodities  such  as
cocoa, corn, soybeans,  soymeal,  and soyoil  which had positive  imediate
reactions  to unexpected  increases  in interest  rates  react  negatively  with a
one-day-lag  to the same  shock.  Such  reversal  in the  one-day-lagged  results
for interest  rates  may reflect  the expectation  of a subsequent  reversal  as
investors  have reasons to believe that the Fed might counteract  large
unexpected  swings  in  interest  rates.
Impact  of Real  Activity  Surprises
52.  The  news  from real activity announcements  was  generally more
important  than  news  from  any  other  announcements.  The  importance  of  news
about  real  activity  was  of  particular  importance  in  period  two.  In  that
period,  11  commodities  reacted  to news  from  the  industrial  production  figures
or from  the  unemployment  rate  figures  either  immediately  or  with  lag. Most  of
the  adjustment  to  news  about  real  activity  came  with  a lagged  effect,  possibly
indicating  some  uncertainty  on the  part  of investors  about  the  future  course
of real activity.  One result  to note about  period  two is that  different
comodity groups  reacted  to news about  real  activity  differently. However,
the  majority  of the significant  effects  of news  of a surge  in real  activity
was to raise  prices.  The strongest  lagged  impact  from  news  about  industrial
production  was in the soybean  complex  and  wheat  prices. The  implication  of
this  positive  price  response  is that  investors  had  a tendency  to believe  that
the  Fed would  remain  passive,  hence  causing  inflation  expectations  to go up.- 31  -
That  the  Fed  would  remain  passive  in such  a period,  i.e.,  when  the  economy  is
coming  out of a local  recession  is  not implausible.  The major  exception  to
this reaction is  the  immediate  impact on  silver prices of  industrial
production  and unemployment  rate shocks.  The decline  in silver  prices  in
response  to a surge  in the  economy  indicates  that investors  in the metals
market took the news to imply that real interest  rates would rise and
inflation  expectations  would  stay  constant.
Impact  of Money  and  Inflation  Surprises
53.  Surprises  from the money  and inflation  announcements  generally  did
not  induce any  significant  reactions  from commodity  prices.  The  few
significant  responses  were not  strong  nor  consistent  within or  across
commodity  groups. Only  the  price  of platinum  responded  to  monetary  surprises
over the  whole  period. In period  one,  only  the  price  of cocoa  and  soybeans
reacted  significantly  to  money  shocks;  their  prices  rose  as money  supply  went
up unexpectedly.  In period  two five commodities  responded  significantly  to
money shocks, either immediately  or with a  lag.  The direction  of the
responses  was not uniform,  however.  The immediate  responses  of palladium,
heating  oil and unleaded  gasoline  were positive,  following  unexpected  money
increases,  whereas  the  immediate  response  of  wheat  and  the  lagged  responses  of
live  cattle  and  wheat  were  negative. An interpretation  of such  mixed  results
is not easy.  In period three,  only five of the commodities  responded
significantly  to  news  about  the  money  supply. The  immediate  impact  on cocoa,
orange  juice,  and copper  was significant  and negative,  while  the impact  on
heating  oil  and  palladium  was  positive.- 32  -
54.  The fact that  most  commodity  prices  were  not  significantly  affected
by money  supply  shocks  can be due  to a number  of reasons. Perhaps  the  most
logical  one  is  that  since  the  Fed  did  not  have  a specific  target  for  M1 during
this  period,  investors  did  not pay  much  attention  to unexpected  movements  in
Ml. This interpretation  concurs  with the findings  of Barnhart  and  PH on the
behavior  of commodity  prices  prior to October  1979 when the Fed did not
emphasize  target  rates  for  Ml.  Dwyer  and  Hafer  also  provide  evidence  on the
insignificant  responses  of three-month  Treasury  bills and 30-year  Treasury
bonds rates to money stock surprises  in the period 1984-87.  If  this
interpretation  is correct,  commodity  prices  should  have  reacted  significantly
to interest  rate  shocks  since  the  Fed  is  more  apt  to take  measures  to offset
interest  rate swings.  As has been seen,  interest  rate shocks  caused  many
commodity  prices  to  be significantly  affected. It is  also  possible,  as shown
by PH and Barnhart,  that  most commodity  markets  react  to shocks  in Ml very
rapidly  and that  movements  in daily  close-to-close  prices  are not capturing
that  effect.
55.  With the exception  of heating  oil  and  gasoline  prices,  most of the
significant  immediate  price  reactions  to news  about  inflation  was negative,
indicating  that  there  was fear  among  investors  of future  tightening  of credit
by the Fed.  However,  the fact  that  the  unexpected  components  of inflation
announcements  did  not induce  immediate  and/or  significant  reactions  from  many
commodities  is not surprising  given that inflation  was not seen to be a
problem  in  the  period  of  analysis.  Therefore,  the  majority  of  investors  might
not have reacted  strongly  to inflation  news given that they did have any
reason  to believe  the  Fed  to  tighten  credit.- 33  -
Grouped  Commodity  Responses
56.  Table 6  presents  the results  of the grouped  seemingly  unrelated
regression  (SUR) commodity  responses  where the slope  coefficients  in each
equation  are  constrained  to be  equal. Results  are  given  for  the  whole  sample
period  and  for  sub-periods.  The  R2 is  a  goodness-of-fit  measure  for  a  SUR
system  [see  Judge  et.  al.,  pages  477-78].
57.  An interesting  result  to  note  is the  importance  of the  real  activity
news (both  immediate  and lagged)  for  the  group  of energy  products. Analysis
of the  whole  period  reveals  that  energy  prices  increased  significantly  as the
unemployment  rate  declined  unexpectedly.
58.  dowever,  the  majority  of  the  lagged  reactions  to  unexpected  increases
in industrial  production  in periods  one  and  three  were  negative. In both  of
these  periods,  the  economy  was  above  the  trend  in industrial  production  (see
Figure  2).  In such periods,  news about  increases  in industrial  production
might  have  been  interpreted  as bad  news,  inducing  the  belief  among  traders  of
possible  credit  tightening  by the  Fed.  However,  the  lagged  reaction  of the
prices  of the crops  and oilseeds  group  was positive  in period  two  when the
economy  was coming  out of a local  recession,  indicating  that  in that  period
investors  had reasons  to believe  that the Fed  would  remain  passive  in its
control  of  credit,  thus  raising  inflation  expectations  and  commodity  prices.
59.  Other  results confirm the major findings from the  individual
responses.  The importance  of the  immediate  impact  of exchange  rate  shocks  on
foods  and livestock,  crops  and oilseeds,  and  metals  is  identified.  All  the
significant  immediete responses are  strong and  negative, as  expected.- 34  -
Surprisingly,  only  the prices  of the  metals  group  responded  significantly  to
exchange  rate surprises  in periods  one and  two.  However,  the signs  of the
responses  in the two  periods  are  different. The  importance  of the  immediate
and  lagged  impact  of interest  rate  surprises  for  crops  and  oilseeds  and  metals
groups  are  also  confirmed. It is interesting  to  note  that  energy  prices  as a
group  had  a significant  negative  immediate  reaction  to positive  interest  rate
surprises  in  period  three.- 35  -
VI*  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
60.  This paper  has  presented  evidence  on the reaction  of 20 commodity
futures  price.  to news in announcements  about  money  supply  (MH),  inflation
indices  (CPI  and  PPI),  and  real  activity  indices  (industrial  production  annd
unemployment)  and  to  shocks  from  the  foreign  exchange  and  credit  markets. For
macroeconomic  variables  (money  stock,  CPI,  PPI,  the  unwmployment  rate  and  the
industrial  production  index)  about  which  announcements  are  made periodically,
survey data were used to  separate  the announcements  into expected and
unexpected components--with  the  latter  measuring news.  For  other
macroeconomic  variables,  whose  values  are realized  on  financial  and  credit
markets (exchange  rates and interest  rates),  autoregressions  were used to
model  their  daily  behavior  and the  residuals  from  these  autoregressions  were
taken  to  be exogeneous  shocks  to  commodity  markets.
61.  It  was  found  that  careful  consideration  must  be  given  to  the  stage  of
the  .. lsiness  cycle  when  analyzing  the  impact  of  news  on  commodity  prices. The
reaction  to news about  other  macroeconomic  variables  as well  as to economic
activity  variables  themselves  appears  to be affected  by the stage  of the
business  cycle. Most  of the  significant  commodity  price  reactions  were  in  the
period 10/01/86-12/31/87  when the  economy was  moving out  of  a  local
recession.  It  is  not  clear  why  this  is  so;  several  possible  reasons  have  been
presented.  It is  a question  which  warrants  further  investigation.  News  about
real  activity  initiated  a response  in  commodity  prices  virtually  only  when  the
economy  was  moving  out  of  a local  recession.  The  impact  of exchange  rate  and
interest  rate  shocks  on  commodity  prices  were  found  to  be significant.- 36  -
62.  News from the  money  stock  and from  inflation  indices  was generally
not  important in explaining  commodity  price behavior.  The  fact that
announcements  about  the  money  stock  did not cause  commodity  prices  to react
significantly  is not surprising  given  that the  Fed did  not have a specific
target for Ml during the sample  period.  It is possible  therefore  that
investors  no longer  use  unexpected  announcements  of  narrowly  defined  money  as
a guide  to the  future  monetary  policy  of the  Fed.  This  interpretation  concurs
with  the  findings  of  Barnhart  and  FH  on  the  behavior  of commodity  prices  prior
to October  1979  when the  Fed  did  not  emphasize  target  rates  for  Ml.  Because
the  Fed  now  follows  several  indicators  as  a guide  for  its  monetary  policy  plus
the fact that during  the sample  period  there  was little  concern  over an
increase  in inflation  seems  to explain  the lack  of reaction  to news about
inflation  indices.
63.  Finally,  several  of the commodities  responded  to news with delay,
indicating  signs  of inefficiency  in  the  commodity  markets.- 37  -
REFERENCES
Barnhart,  S.W. (1988),  "Commodity  Futures  Prices and Economic  News:  An
Examination  Under  Alternative  Monetary  Regimes,"  The Journal  of Futures
Markets  8:  483-510.
(1989),  "The Effects of  Macroeconomic  Announcements  on  Commodity
Prices,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  71:  389-403.
Batten,  D.S.  and  M.T.  Belongia  (1986),  "Monetary  Policy,  Real  Exchange  Rates,
and  U.S.  Agricultural  Exports,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics
68:  422-27.
Belongia  M.T. and R.A. King (1983),  "A Monetary  Analysis  of Food Price
Determination,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  65:  131-35.
Board  of  Governors  (1985),  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  Board  of  Governors  of  the
Federal  Reserve  System,  December.
Bond, G.E. (1984),  "The  Effects of Supply  and Interest  Rate Shocks in
Commodity  Futures  Markets,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  66:
294-301.
Chambers,  R.G. (1981),  "Interrelationships  between  Monetary  Instruments  and
Agricultural  Commodity  Trade,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics
63:  934-41.
====- (1984),  "Agricultural  and  Financial  Market  Interdependence  in the  Short-
Run,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  66:  12-24.
====- (1985),  "Credit  Constraints,  Interest  Rates,  and  Agricultural  Prices,"
American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  67:  390-95.
- and R.E. Just (1979),  "A Critique  of Exchange  Rate Treatment in
Agricultural  Trade  Models,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  61:
249-57.
-----  (1981),  "Effects  of Exchange  Rate  Changes  on  U.S.  Agriculture:  A  Dynamic
Analysis, American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  63:  32-46.
--  ^-  (1982),  "An Investigation  of the Effects  of Monetary  Factors  on U.S.
Agriculture,"  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  9:  235-247.
Dwyer,  G.P.  and  R.W.  Hafer  (1989).  "Interest Rates  and  Economic
Announcements."  Review,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis,  71:  34-46.
Dornbusch,  R (1976),  "Expectations  and Exchange  Rate  Dynamics,"  Journal  of
Political  Economy  84:  1161-76.
Fame, E.F. and M.R. Gibbons  (1982),  "Inflation,  Real Returns  and Capital
Investment,"  Journal  of  Monetary  Economics  9:  297-323.
Frankel,  J.A.  (1984),  "Commodity  Prices  and  Money: Lessons  from  International
Finance,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics:  66:  560-66.- 38  -
(1986),  "Expectations  and Commodity  Price  Dynamics: The Overshooting
Model,"  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  68:  344-48.
Frankel,  J.A.  and  C.A.  Hardouvelis  (1985),  "Commodity  Prices,  Money  Surprises
and  Fed  Credibility,"  Journal  of  Money  Credit  and  Banking  17:  425-38.
Gilbert,  C.L. (1985),  Efficient  Commodity  Price  Dynamics. Division  Working
Paper No.  1985-4,  International  Commodity  Markets  Division,  The World
Bank,  Washington,  DC.
--- , (1987),  Metals  Market  Efficiency  in Relation  to Foreign  Exchange  and
Financial  Markets, Division  Working Paper No.  1987-9, International
Commodity  Markets  Division,  The  World  Bank,  Washington,  DC.
Gardner,  B. L. (1981),  "On the Power  of Macroeconomic  Linkages  to Explain
Events  in U.S.  Agricultural  Economics,"  American  Journal  of Agricultural
Economics  63:  871-78.
Crennes, T.J. and  J.S. Lapp  (1986), "Neutrality  of  Inflation in  the
Agricultural  Sector,"  Journal  of  International  Money and  Finance  5:  231-
43.
Hakkio, C.S. and D.K. Pearce  (1985),  "The Reaction  of Exchange  Rates to
Economic  News,"  Economic  Inquiry  23:  621-36.
Hardouvelis,  G.K.  (1988),  "Economic  News,  Exchange  Rates  and  Interest  Rates,"
Journal  of International  Money  and  Finance  7:  23-35.
Judge,  G.C.,  W.E.  Griffiths,  R.C.  Hill,  H. Lutkephohl,  and T.C.  Lee (1985),
The  Theory  and  Practice  of  Econometrics,  2nd  edition,  John  Wiley  and  Sons,
Inc.,  New  York.
Milanos,  N.T. (1986),  "Price  Variability  and the  Maturity  Effect  in Futures
Markets,"  Journal  of Futures  Markets  6:  443-60.
Orden,  D.  (1986),  "Agriculture,  Trade  and  Macroeconomics:  The  U.S. Case."
Journal  of  Policy  Modeling  8: 27-51.
Pearce,  D.K. (1988),  "Information,  Expectations  and Foreign  Exchange  Market
Eificiency,"  Paper presented  at  the International  Agriculturai  Trade
Consortium,  December  14,  San  Antonio,  Texas.
Pearce,  D.K.  and  V.V.  Roley  (1985),  "Stock  Prices  and  Economic  News."  Journal
of  Business  58:  49-67.
Pindyck,  R.S.  and  J.J.  Rotemberg  (1988),  "The  Excess  Co-Movement  of Commodity
Prices,"  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  2617.
Rauser, G.C.,  J.A.  Chalfant, H.A.  Love  and  K.C.  Stamoulis (1986),
"Macroeconomic  Linkages,  Taxes and Subsidies  in the U.S. Agricultural
Sector," American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics  68:  399-412.
Schuh,  G.E.  (1974),  "The  Exchange  Rate  and  U.S.  Agriculture,"  American  Journal
of  Agricultural  Economics  56:  1-13.Table  I  - Commodity  Futures  Contract  Characteristics
Mini-m. C/  Maximum  /C
Price  Change  Price  Change
Delivery  Trading  /A  Contract  /C  Per  Per  Per  Per
Commodity  Code  Fxchange  /A  Months  Hours  Size  Unit  Contract  Unit  Contract
(E.S.T.)
Foods  & Livestock
Cocoa  CO  csce  3,5.7,9,12  9:30-3:00  10  metric  tons  S 1/ton  $10.00  S8R.OO/ton  $  880
Coffee  CF  CSce  3,5,7,9,12  9:45-2:28  37,500  lb  $.0001/lb  S 3.75  S  .04/lb  Sl,500
Live Cattles  LC  CHE  2,4,6,8,10,12  10:05-2:00  40,000  lb  $.00025/lb  $10.00  $  .015/lb  S  600
Orange  Juice  OJ  NYCE  1,3,5,7,9,11  10:15-2:45  15,000  lb  S.0005/lb  S 7.50  S  .05/lb  S  750
Pork Belltes  PB  CME  2,3,3,7,8  10:10-2:00  38,000  lb  S.00025/lb  $ 9.50  $  .02/lb  $  760
Sugar  (11)  SU'  CSCE  1,3,5,7,9,10  10:00-1:43  112,000  lb  S.0001/lb  S11.20  S  .005/lb  S  560
(World)
Crops
Corn  Cm  CBT  3,5,7,9,12  10:30-2:15  5,000  bus.  S.0025/hus.  $12.50  8.10  bus.  S  500
Cotton  (02)  CT  NYCE  3,5.7,10,12  10:30-3:00  50,000  lb  S.0001/lb  S 5.00  S.02/lb  $1,000
Soybeans  SB  CBT  1,3,5,7,8,9,11  10:30-2:15  5,000  bus.  S.0025/bus.  S12.50  8.30/bus.  81,504
Soy  Heal  SM  CB  1,3,5,7,8,9,10,12 *10:30-2:15  100  tons  S.10/ton  $10.00  810.00/ton  S1,000
Soy Oil  sO  COT  1,3,5,7,8,9,12  10:30-2:15  60,000  lb  $.0001/lb  $  6.00  S.01/lb  S  600  W
Wheat  WR  CBT  3,5,7,9,12  10:30-2:15  5,000  bus.  S.0025/bus.  $12.SO  8.20/bus.  81,000
Energies
Crude  Oil  OX  NYKEX  All  Months  9:30-3:30  1,000  barrels  5.01/barrel  S10.00  $1.00/barrel  S1,000
Heating  Oil (#2)  ON  NYNEX  All Months  9:50-3:05  1,000  barrels  8.0001/gallon  S  4.20'  S  .02/gallon  $  840
Gasoline  HU  NYNEX  All  Months  9:55-3:00  1,000  barrels  S.0001/gallon  S  4.20  $  .02/gallon  $  840
(regular  unleaded)
Metals
Copper  CP  COMEX  1,3,5,7,9,12  9:50-2:00  25,000  lb  8.0005/lb  $12.50  8  .05/lb  S1,250
Gold  GZ  CRT  2,3,4,6,8,10,12  9:00-2:30  32.15  troy  oz  S.10/oz  S 3.22  S50.00/oz  S1,607.50
Palladium  PA  NYNE%  3,6,9,12  9:00-2:20  100  troy  o0  S.05/oz  S 5.00  S 6.00/oz  8  600
Platinu  nL  NYNEX  1,4,7,10  9:10-2:30  50 troy  oz  S.10/oz  $  5.00  S25.00/oz  S1,250
Silver  SV  COMEX  1,3,5,7,9,12  8:05-1:25  5000  troy  oz  S.001/oz  S 5.00  $  .50/oz  $2,500
/A  CBT - Chicago  Board  of Trade;  CHE  - Chicago  Nercantile  Exchange;  COMEX  - Cotiodity  Exchange,  Inc.  (New York);
CSCC - Coffee,  Sugar,  and Cocoa  Exchange  (New York);
NYCe - New York  Cotton  Exchange;  NY4EX  - New York  Mercantile  Exchange.
/B  TimeS  quoted  are  as of  July  1986.
/C  Figures  reported  are  as  of  July  1986.~aPs  a "9up  -"  mpw  up mg  -uJp  9p  pro  am I-a  Mt3A  a"  Ia  "I  ea  up  arp  Up  *a  ion  P
dk4  isto  49  -D  -P  miprp  U.  up a  m  p  AM  VW-PM  us  -mt-fw  Sp or,  pw  s  (mm3  lam  lon  lua  'ar
ERPM  in.-  "3  '  - P=O  M'  p  Pon-  MP inm  Ca  WU9-  "9  0maq  ina  =mp p  ana  mjgtw  so  qip  s
- -3  mm  1  moo" "So  so  in  &mu  pap up  upa  mi  - PWamsoo  pm  - mp  s  MP  m '-iv  .A  mvid  Opp
Nowi p  MID up Po ap  ~  r-  inM  so  p ma-  up sq  OLMwla  Up -m  m  at Wm  up  -wM01  p  I  wn  MP
(81  Mlms  'AMtm  'irn  wIwam up JO  '-p  f-m  in  - z  A  ma  - Ma  p  mainjip  up Po so  134  qia  won  'u 
A  ~  p  a"  =rPF  up  mm  qIuP so  aftINP  wrwtm  mP M up tP  ppsnq1mh  uupmbpm  up uam in  M  t  OF  ~  mm  -aMP
a- *m  p sop  so  ea 3 Am  3 ra  p ~am  up  m  aMw  =m  Atw  4P  up uq wo  wmm  up  apininI  of "Wp  =W  e
Twom  AupI  - (an  p  -M 'an  lm  n  'ann  *i  uu  w  Rn  e  - so impOMPA  TP  BP  RM3  pm  DP  %  4 U
-pPon  up -la  u  p  iI  MN 
maw £tmp  am  ~  - up  ~  ~  Imp..~  upaou-aippp  oTIat  o  uppu  n  mIga
119P  -AmP  uo  P-9  VI  Ii  - ,  TOM~  AT-  Sw =OVW-  1ub  31' 'mp  UppatA  upna sam TA  hlaWBMid  GS
1111  Pm  7X 'IM  'an  'MM 'Ian  'al  iNin1-  UP P Gmir  rdW-  . P  up inm  PE 'wn  'Wm3  'gnt  'MM I  '131  'OM
pm  S  - M~r  -NW sow  A  p  mm  ,  'mam  Iwos  m  mu  VI mpdm  '  so  my =  pmw  W up anp  'maonI  pimI
'WtUin.4  ins-P  up  inU09  *..6 A
'wins-  -I-K  up13  p inw,ama  wqu  up omxaba  am  anup  m -0  umwu up aum-  sq  4  la
WI  U'-  99I-  I;'-  8D'  U'l  K%l  £I'I-  3'3  £9'  31-19W-  S.  31 
,W,  W  K.,  W1  dt:,  I3'  la  or-90  It'-  £3*  39'.  ii'-  Z-  1.3'  W0  WlI-  W-'l  a,'  K.*m
6ol  olI  B*  3'-  "W-  CC%-  5'-l  99I  a'Z-  $*I  5'  w%-  31i-  6'-  *I9a
3.3  %It  IV'  93'  It'-  39`'  39.3  S'-  Clft'  wSIT  s-  W-  g'-  u' 
lto,  "WI  WAIT  moZ  ow,  .10'  £(W  et,  11-  69',  W9  mU",  £3'  gi3'  3l-  2i"-  Ic%-  srw'gv
a'  06'  or-  '*-  n'-  ar'-  or-  or  N  6  -WI  mi  p-  I  C-  or~
AV'  zr  a,"?  is',  aor  W'-6  o-  .:'-  ii  ic'-  CT,  w..u'  W  do.  99'-  It.  3'  £  p;
611I-  all  U*31- GE,  u-  ,;-  foo  Gil  (92  39t-  £91  U'  U-  5  a
4w  owl  l  WIulf3  .3`'`  .0'0  elI'  99  9'-  3-  N'  410,- "Wn  £0'-  WI-  £91i  63%-  3'
3W'-  £5'  31  W  £0'1% 30'-  9'  E I-  £3'  W9'  1£  '  30'-* .93'  AD'  W*1  9-  W'  ..
1'A-I  a'-  Ill-  £ll  01'-  Lt'S  O0'-  ot'-  UWI-  W'lI  33  01i-  8'  1
Ur'  W  eUl  9r1  l3'~  30'-  30'-  9VT-  C9'  03%'  SS'  93'  M%  (  (3ENI  n'  91117  Iii-  Sr  (3)  iD
33'  U  991  Wi  31'all dO'  A'  ff£9'-  i  '  S£'  3'l  33'  111)-  10'  WIl-  Wl-  3£'t
"I  i  *1%  o't  s'-  W,  or  st-s.  or-  40'  u'  W  aw'  GI%  Is,  aM
£3'  W  U'  £9  30'  30'~(Al- 3  o  IL'  W6'  £0l'  =%-  SD'  5'  S'  IIIiiI  S'  U'
mr-  is,  K,  t  5'  3'-  I Ill  .33or '-  93.  a`-  w%  W  W'  W*  W3  W3  £.'
M  5'  T  W  or  110% Im%  sr  WtI  3%-  01-  93'  W'  WV'  ID'  £'Pil  U'l  91,*  90  199*4
(164  '-  I  3'-11~  %  af'  a`-  a,m  19'-  K'  *'  II  5'  1  W'-££a
8D'-  GS'  611  U1  110'  - 99'-  so  99'  wi-  £'t1  sr'  9'  a3'  03'  1  5' -401  wI-  or  Tom  M
wD,-  0*  SD*  in'-  fA%I  t  9-  C39*3  '  60-~3  U'  11)%  ll-  W'  a
M'  or'  W'  TLC,  till-o  III  K,-  "-  991t-  93'S  33'-£W'N  Si.  M  Ulf5  - al-  a,  inm-qAl
'  n  WI  61'  U"`  5'  D9'  M'  9"'  K'  5'-9;'1  63*1  SM,  ID'  a
mu'  Or  ££  S  U'  to.  I:  it'l-  IK3'  o,  a  ,'  £  W,  W  DI  V  t  w%  3,  ori  3  3'
W  36'-  9`'  a'-  M'  3-  Li'  UP-I  09'  83l'  3'.  U  cl)'  a,  3
urn'-  N'  1'  5'  Go.  M'`  3'D  £'  ID'  Wl-  OD'  83'-  WV'  £'  WI  06'-  100'  01'  1 
so  £3-  '  'l  3'-a31'  93  I'  6'-  0f'-  ID:  0'-  CC'  5E'  330'  33'  31'  93'  £1  10%-  93'%  M'3  Z9-  ;'  £'-  U'aSC 3'"  £0'£  ,'£-  W  1£'M
8D':  4D'  fl'-  99'3-  0'  ID'  *'I-  fill-  '-  ID'  GE'  W'  £9'-  C'  a
50'l  6£'  6,'  re  it'  3OD`-  £D'  (6`1-  5'  SD'  CL'  33l(3'83  D  - WV  f  £~O'  3£i-  Zi'  mW
OD'  TE'-,  W'  5.3-  '  3(1  ml,-  wt'-99gil  a,  Ti  6~  09'  5',  1
W3  dCii  £11  59'S  UV'  83'-  8'  5'1-  G  w£i'I  3'%  01"'  Io.  M'  M  W,'  a'  £0'  ww
U'l-  WIZ  MI-  99'I-  33'l  Ii  I  W-5  i-4'  £'  '  U
010  .361  dSIt  .t£3  99'-  .10'  W9'  931'-  93'-  W'  5'  t.33  MD'  60'-  Sr  "I'  £,1'  1'  (73)13
WI:  3'%-  3D1  lU'  £:  M9'  W.'  M'  0'  01-  10%'  g `-'  £`'  UC' 
M3'  illI  U'  "9.  .51  W'  edt'  93'-  a6  39'IW 3'  - 90'  1  1W'  60'  %  C0  £9'-  - £0
5 I  '-  33'-  9'-  a  M`'  61'  £0`1-  lK'  11  39  l-u  1'-  W'  WI  V 
Ur  W  99'  .39'3di'  go'  30%,  30',  £3i-69"It  30",  W  om'  aw8  '  0  It,  41  3'a  3£'l  it  o
~~  Cd  U  3d~  an  sam  urn  am  tan  aiM  un  Wu  an  vm  an  351  Wi  M
MCD-  31835  imiat 'ONDmi  M=  asmininm  at  da  p  x  p m  m  gq
- O017TAb  3 - bed{M  Rd  I_  Cdit  1MO  N_c  Pan, le  IA011111  - 093D6
o_Ezd~~~~~~te  y  um  MwP  an  um  UIn  un  um  uema  xW  n  illp  Uut  urm  n  n  n2  ri  1
mmS  & LAm
G0  -%a  .10  -1.94  .97  -09  .01  -%7**  1.01*  .29  .2  -1.02  -%05  -%0  .06  1.36  1.75*  .63  III
t  .S2  .10  -ON  .63  .70  .66  -3.24  1.D  .3D  .09  -%6  .38  -%4  .2S
cofee  .86  1.44  3.02  1.37'  -%22  .01  -07  -1.26  - 40  4.36  -J  .23  -. 002  .36*  .96  .85  1.1  -%Ml
t  1.11  1.06  .72  .66  -1.27  -.43  _".  -1.0  -%30  M.I  -.A0  1.32  _%12  1.83
Okttle (l[A,e)  .75  -1.33  1.X  .05  -,.0  --. *  -.2P*  - 25  1.69*  -Al  -10  .16  .01  W  1.7*  2.101A 1.62  .A,'
t  1.49  -1.52  .69  .63  -%?  -1.52  -IT  -%3D  1.94  -.23  -1.55  1.46  .92  -I.S9
Or"Jul  J20  .40  -68**  .W  -03  -%OD  .07  a  2.0  -_81  -1.89  .17  _XODD  -03  1.31  .F2  I.W  .011S
t  .37  A  -1.99  .42  -28  -%W  S  .53 .7  3.14  _28  -1.39  1.49  -.G2  _b23
rack 11t11  A69  -1.17  46  .CIt  GG00  _02  -43  -%17  .U3  -2.76  -L3D  .Ih)  .01  _%16  .71  .95  .52  sAm
t  .ff  _ff5  .22  .01  _G2  -. 54  -1.27  _%2  .3  _7  -. 21  .S2  _99*  _19D
9mp,  <~~~~-.13  .29  -1.8D  3.71  .29  .009  .22  1.22  _*2Q -7d9  .,1  _%22  .03  -.3S  .47  .U3  .54  _01'
t  _n7  .11  _ 23  .9S  JB  .31  .59  .85  .16  -LGO  .33  -a6  .G2  -1.03
.47  .8U  .55  L22  .IS  _%  m  _10 _89  -1.13  -a40  -142  .11  .06-%0  .19  .2  .16  _%07
t  .35  .36  Co  .3  .52  _11M  -_29  _%67  _4*  _C6  _39  -.37  .22  _Q(1
(tkttn  .36  _%14  37  S.16  -bl6  t01  '  _16  Q2  .06  -%62  -1.93  .22  .02  .37  29  .19  .40  -%( I
t  .2  _C6  .75  .05  _%5  -.41  -%Al  .33  .03  -_C9  -5S  .76  .76  1.12
S*o  ~~~~~-D  50  96  -ao3  2.34  .45  _0O3  _74  19II*  .31  -3.56  -&3D  -,.I  .23  --L$2  .42  .02  d2  -_01
t  ~~~~~-.05  _411  _C.6  .C9  .2D  _%12  _%29  1.95  .0  _0  _%23  -%O  I.C9  -1.12
So  Mal  .11  -.41P  -4  l-S2  _Q02  -.GOS  -_14  _G06  .3S  _%35 -3.100  _%02  .02  ;C06  .99  .65  1.14  _4O31
t  .24  -1.0  -_17  1.22  _X17  _%54 -1.23  U%1  . 2  -.14  -LO  _%23 '-I.5  _56 
Scy  au  ,W  L31 _  n7  .32  .03  -DI.G07  _%1  .73  -L7  _46  .3VA  .01  -%03  .86  .37  1.35  _M--.
t  n%7 1.26  _23  .19  .19  _%56  - As  _%23  .69  -1.A  *bt  2.57  -%79  -_191
H"t  _D~~~~%5  .32  -%a  -b8  .17  --MS!  -250  -%II  -ID  -1.05  -bg  .11  M*I  -b12  .6S  .44  .67  .%C'2
t  -%a  .31  -i21  -%51  1.34  -_42  -1.67  _t19  _%3D _%33  _37V  M  1.82  -_f
Qub  0t1  1.67  -,M  -10fiP  LOS  I.6V*  .03  -b13  M7  .31  9.00  2.39  .1U  03G  .21  1.24  1.93*  .74  .a w4
t  1.51  _OS4  -1.6  .35  -LS  1.31)  _46  .006  .16  I.SI  ADS  .n3  -I.29  74
Hmt?  OIl (2)  LO?  -1.80)  -1.33  3.78  -%69*  .0  _-40  .01  -1.20  d4  .10  .t2  -%02  .02  I.Q  1.94  .2D  .aM
t  .9  -. 94  _%23  L26  -2.69  .99  -L45  .GI  -.63  .14  OGI  .4  _%75  _07
GSoDiM  (tqa
amet)  .17  -L73  -L42  L69  -%3P  .01  -%22  _  65  _%97  .56  .2  .18 _G2  .96  1.50  .61  _OD2
t  .19  -1.7  -1.66  .6S  -1.92  _53  -i93  _S33  _al  .12  .11  .89  -I.U  a  .m
r  .07  _n2  L06  1.13  .07  AOI  -06  U%I  -k45  -L5  .0e6  .10  .002  -%26*  .97  .71  1.211  -%Ml
t  .2D  -1.09  .SI  -1.11  .79  .12  _59g  _40  _%7  n  76  _C68  1.19  .29  ?7.SD
Cold  .0S  ft38  -. 72  .2  .16  _GG02 -b31"  .21  _.50  -Ml  .96  _%06  _01  _%10  1.17  1.5S  .59  Jo0
t  .Ao  -%sD  _n  .19  1.63  _%03 -2.76  .48  -J6  -1.07  .8t  _Q6  _%93  _-91
P&dU  -i13  -t.27  3.60  1.10  .12  -. 3*  -33*  _%07  -%S7  -LOW  .14  _C05  .C05  .22  1.3  1.69  1.03  .oln
t  -.18  -1.03  .ff  .56  .8D  -L 1  -1.85  _%10  _SS  L41  .07  _%03  .35  1.27
Platgon  .U2  -. 78  -3.11  1.11  .1S  _%01  -%3U  .36  -%3  41  -LI&  -b  03  -101  _10  .70D  1.07  .24  _010
t  .59  -t.44  _Qo  .58  .93  _%56  -4.72  .52  428  -%57  _%1  -.UI  -.70  .56
Sulwr  -b34  _90  OS  1.81  -%02  .001  .06  -%7  -%32  %4V6  -37  G3W  -02  %06  .71  .33  1.10  _a1f9
t  _539  _%91  .m  l.t8  _14  JS5  .39  -1.31  _%32 -t.78  _26  . .22  -1.44  -25
See the  otot  at  dbe Itt  cf  bbb  2  *w a  pWlwo
ni ad n2 am  h_ 7 a  d  _  42  I  ad
IF3  ha  14 ad  4*  d_  et  fnlThl  4  - Ht1*  ad  tad  ~dty  frPus  2I-ewt  lb..  Solo0/01/86  - 1/33/87
oid1ty  r  26  tl  tiI  MP  UR  DIt  tiR  uP  1W!  1!  21  Ium  us:n  Zut  n  12  73  7
* UU5110
Ox"  -%I  2.97  .52  1.97  -16*  %003  -%3*  -22  .24  1.61  .78  .0  -J02P  .06  2.31"  3.44"** I.3!  ^5
t  -.33  .91  .21  1.39  -1.69  -61  4.3  -.67  .18  .6  .5s  .0  -2.5  .U
Offee  -.33  A6  -3.44  -8  -,.O  .01  -_07  .27  -_21  -1.39  1.02  .14  -_.0  .55"  .72  .40  2.03  -011
t  -680  .21  -8  -J  -J.3  1.16  -%  .t6  .09  .31  .42  .5  -. 3  2.41
Cittle ((we)  .0  1.28  -1.31  .67  -.37*  As  -.42"  -86"  .34  .40  *07  .25"  .OOR  .09  3.W1  2.37"  1.00  .n
t  .5  .95  -54  .U  7  1.78  .89  -3.09  -42  .5  .16  .J  -2.60  1.21  .16
aGin  JAM  .2S  17  -1.03  212  .09  ."  .3*  .47  -.21  6.49*  .26  .01  -.02  . 2.0"  2""  1.63  .043
t  .A  1.22  -_*6  1.62  1.01  2.90  1.9  1.97  -.17  2.92  .rs  .1  -_2  .A8
Pb* klEll.  -.47  1.33  46  1.41  .02  .02  -.14  - 96  4.4'  7.83  -57  .33*  -%R  0AU  .80  .40  1.23  -fm3
t  -73  .5*  .14  .*  .GII  Lo  -%53  -1.49  1.0  1.63  -20  -1.7J  -_U  .17
1.15  4.64  1.44  -. 71  -18  -%S6 -2.18  -224  .19  6.47  7.82  -.77  --. 0  2.53  .22  .2n  .25  -. nOi
t  .a  .21  *2  2  .01-21  -.12  -%55-99  -.42  .21  .16  .33  -6  -%17  1.15
-%52  -2.64  -.72  1.27  -02  *  .GC02 .38  -LG2  4.41  1.69  -.21  -b01'  .21  1.9"  2.q2'  1.9*  .042
t  -3.3  -1.01'  -%24  .72  -. s  3.14  .Ot  1.45  -1-2.  1.48  I.G7  -.93  -3.77  1-.2
Cott=  t  .14  -3730  2.77  -1.84  .10  .02"  .23  .2  .66  4.3  -.44  .15  .0  .22  1.11  3.43  .9  .'I¶s
t  .9  -. 91  .78  -87  68  2.13  1.44  .47  .34  1.2  -. n  2.0G  .7  LU
9ayteuw  s  -22  -%8  -S4  48 C  07  .U"  .1*  .12  -.95  -07  3.65"  -.11  .0G"  .06  2.36"  2-03"  2."  .045  1
t  -74  _U  _-2*1  . *G  3 34  .28  .40  -.79  -. 032  79  -1.19 -74  .48
S;y  ll  -03  -L.6  2.21  -35  . .01  .M*  *27  -I.nD  -582"  3-P  -*13  -U.02"  .11  2LOM 2.n5  2.9i"  .041 
t  -_G7  -1.31  .77  -21  .43  1.46  1.68  .69  -64  -LOI  2.26  -3.08  -2.4  .0
SoY  au  .34  .29  .74  2.12  .03  .02"  .0?  -03  -L23  4.26  5.0"  -.11  -01'  ;15  2.37"  .24  3.VA"  I
t  -. 6  .28  .25  1.23  o2n  2.54  .43  -.09  -1.40  1.45  3.6  -%97  -1.  -_9
III  -%o65  w  2  .34  .52  -.14!  *  l  *O  .02  -.69*  -1.70  3.32  3.71"  -. 3Ym  -. %9"  .18  23"  .71  4.04"  .03
t  -I.E  LD  .U  .33  -1.31  .32  -14  -2.95  -1.12  1.5  2.3  -3.12  -U 3  1.26
i5i  U  .73  7n  2.41-va  .s  -.D3  .23  .43  2.01  L02  -3.77P  .04  -_G07 _2  .54  .72  U.2  -mw.
t  L.52  -1  .SD  -.V1  .3*  -.81.7  .91  *  .0  - *  -1.80  .2  -75  -I.01
FIbi,  OII  tR)  LO2" -1.9  41. -. 42  *02  -. 05  .09  .52  on  a6)  -3.42  G003  -_09  ;a  .98  3.02  X7  -.n
t  L  -2.1  _3  A2  -.  .14  -_3  .47  2.20  .*03  .75  -. 65-M  -.93  -LG9
waft  "  Lb203"  -G5  L23  -70  -02  -01  o2  .49  2LG0  .3  -1.79  .02  -b0I  -%22  L3S  .57  Lo01  .06
t  L43-a  .30-.45  ..25  -96  U25  1315  17  12  -. 26  *  .4  -3.  -%6
i.35  -1.3  .59  -.40  .3  0*U  _-23  .21  1.6  .14  L6D  -_290  .2'  .31*  3&0  .67"  2  "  2.  3
t  77  -_99  . - .*98  *4tD  -1.21  53  t16  - 4 125  -111.9  1.65
G  .31  .57  -L94  *  .22  *  -31"  .06  -_43  -66  -.32  -%4  .0  .32"2  M  L5  l.GD  .
t  .54  Jl  .25 -1.41  0  9-  L.  4  1  1  .n9  -03  -.2  -521  -_42  .012  52
Va11lta  .89* -2.26  -36A  -3L  *3  .01  '.3  .21  -1.14  5.60  *97  -%10  0  .61"  -L6*t  L2"  3.23"  .O0M
c  148  -%GI  -%,  -.- L16  1.45f  1.0-  3  .44  .6  340  .47  -%l0  Lo  3.17
flt  *  .70  *25  .0  .37  -%01  AP  -%49A `;18  -1.9  .3  -1.90  -.25  -01  _  9W L7  2L6  2.2"  .JlD
t  .L41  .12  .0  -2L.  -L361.73-2  1  *37  -_9  .ID  -%S  -L04  .S  J53J
Slr  *.9  L92  *73  4.2  A3  42  1m74  -. 14  -1.78  7.15  2O  -_22  .01  .91"  LS.7  L.91  2.41"  .C6
t  1.3  *73  *15  43W  161  L25  -LA  '.  -.45  1.4_  0.0  -3.14  .67  3.40
faA  - 3m  3  bu
bt  thw  o  i  de  ham  d  ts  2 fw  ora.21ti
Pt ad  It  ah 3m 7  d  339 I I  d  tudm
3  No  14 ad  33  d  fiTabltt S - lmiste  -d Lewd  IndLvlXl  1Vv  N=m_mc  Hum,  &1a  01/aWSS - 05/31/89
Comoity  IFB  tPPI  UCI  UIP  UER  UlR  LIR  UMi  UIPP  UllPI  UWIP  IUJ  IIR  U  lFR  U  n  Fl  2  F3  R2
ROD6 6  LIVEblmX
G  ~~~~~~-1.6P**  .49  -1.06  -4e4  _%os  -%s  -17  _u4  -b8l  2W5  -4.95  -. 15  .01  .07  1.13  1.41  .79  .aos
t  -2.31  .28  -- 34  -1.46  -. 57  -. 4a  -Ag  -%.67  -. 46  .-79  -1.53  -%94  .63  .OD
Coffee  .13  -2  sR*  -3.39  -4.6  -%03  -ol0  .04  .70  -1.51  09  _%12  .22  .OL  -%4  1.09  1.31  .82  o01
t  ~~~~.27  -1.94  -1.29  -1.50  -_21  -70  .19  1.l7  -1.02  -. 23  n^  1.63  AS6  -. 70
Cattle  (Live)  -_32  .2t  .61  *02  -%04  ms0  .09  .19  -%41  -%31  -L75  I12  .02  .07  .n2  .25  1. t
t  ~~~-.84  .22  .36  AN  _a.  -. 53  .66  .AD  -%U  -_  -1.55  -1.39  1.64  .56
Orar4p  Juc  _19  -%57  2.86  -%78  .02  m04  .19  -%836  1.67  .02  -AoP*  esO  m%O4  .01  1.15  .66  L.60  .m06
e  n_44  -. 52  1.49  -_38  .24  -. 35  1.25  -1.90  1.D3  *01  -2.04  -%76  -. v7  *es
Pork  Bellies  .27  _%92  .73  -2.82  -%05  -02  .10  -1-31  -2.13  -L78  4.51  .04  CAD7  .76*  *49  .13  .82
t  .21  -. 39  .0  -. 47  -. 18  -.A4  .22  -1.01  -. 66  .49  -. 76  .13  _22Z  1.76
&o  1.39  -2.22  .32  -&30  -. 12  -¢02  *58  .89  2.44  -L75  -L56  .15  -%05  .31  .44  As8  .4  -. 023
t  .f  -. e2  .e,  -. 94  -,07  -A5  1.15  .e2  .*  .43  -%39  .46  -1.3D  .64
ODM  ~~~.67  -. 12  -%91  4.30  .25*  _m07  .04  .35  .07  -2.33  -4.7  .0i3  _-ol  .12  .94  1.10  .65  -%002
t  1.10  -. es  _04  1.51  1.79  -_46  .19  .57  .as  _87  -- 23  .23  -. 96  .58
Cottun  -%28  .44  2.54  4.76**  _o1  _ae2  .08  .14  .17  .57  -L3D  .13  .01  .05  .86  1.31  .52  _%005
t  -.60  37  1.23  2.19  csO  -1L60  .52  .30  .15  .28  -1.C7  1L25  . OD.3
Soybari  .45  -1.44  -1.23  4.54  .32  .005  -%08  .34  _04K  1.07  2.40  .¢4  .m4  _%04  .SD  1.39  .19  -bos1
t  .76  -. %6  --46  1.62  2.32  .34  .AS  *s7  -M  .3  40  -A?  .2B  .26  ->22 
soy  tbal  .51  -. 50  -1.63  5.27*  .32**  m.02  -i34  .26  .07  .36  -1.18  .09  .o￿.  -19  .95  1.683  .26  snD2  @
t  .82  -. 32  -. 59  1.81  2.23  --13  -1.57  .42  .04  .13  -. 41  .34  .72  -. 851
soy  QTlI  .68  -1.66  -%37  3.93  .16  .m3  .13  .50  .34  .19  -4.1  .10  .003  -- 11  .69  .92  .51  -. 012
t  1.13  -1.10  -. 14  1.40  1.19  .18  .60  .83  .23  .07  -1.47  .71  .D  ->52
Wht  -_.1  -b  2  .65  4.29  .08  ODI  .11  .63  -. 83  -1.08  -2.91  .12  _Al  -. 01  .61  . .60  _016
t-  -. 28  -. 03  .27  1.68  .62  CB5  .99  1.15  -. 61  -_45  -1.15  .97  -. 41  -50
EN31GIE:
xlie  Oil  .19  -05  -138  -3.45  _leI  -. 02  .62  .6  .36  _44  -3.89  _Is1  -. 04**  -547  1.20)  1.05  LSO  -. ms8
t  .24  -. 08  -. 39  -_93  -1.0  _.844  .25  1.19  .18  -. ut  -1.06  -_83  -2.05  -1.73
Hecating  Oil  (02)  -. 64  -03  6.22**  -1.24  -_23  >04*  .01  1.3Dt  1.0e  -06  -4.61  -. ll  -. 01  ->,13  1.26  1.62  .95  .01o
t  ~~~~-.92  -_.9  2  e03  -. 38  -1.44  -2.19  .C4  1.87  .62  -. 02  1.44  -. 69  -. 01  -. 57
(Casoline  (TwApl3r
unled)  _ 6  _4  6.34*  .n6  -_27  _,04*  .18  .18  1.0|2  1.22  -6.01*  -- 25  .oD4  -. 01  1.26  1.47  1.02  .010
t  -. 85  -. 07  1.91  .02  -1.59  -1.95  .7o  .70  1.35  .65  .74  -1.43  .24  --X5
'  r  ~~~~~~-1.53*  2.48  2.62  -4.0  -OD  -_¢03  .07  .45  -3.50  -_14  -1.84  -. 20  .02  -. 75**  1.40  1.0  1. 75*  .016
t  -1.75  1.14  .68  -1.01  -1.0  -. 15  .Y4  .51  -1.60  -. 04  -. 46  - 1.01  .15  -L  54
Gold  .20  1.08  _  %  1.35  -. 02  .01  -. 04  .21  .16  -_.1  -1.74  -. 07  -. ons  -.  I  1.21  1.39  .88  nB
t  ~~~~~.74  1.61  -. 81  IAcs  -. 3B  1.59  -. 40  .7n  .24  -. 13  1.41  -1.15  -. 82  -1.22
?II.dLifts  1  >25  j.32  -1.85  .73  .18  .03*  -08  1.07**  .62  -. 73  .64  .07  _M1  _02  1. 50  1.86*  .87  .019
t  ~~~~-.S8  1.07  -. es  .32  1.99  2.69  -1.07  2.16  .5n  -. 34  .23  .614  -. 07  -.  o
Plati"sa  .36  1.fis  -2.11  ->53  -. l  .nn  M5_~14  .44  .09  _54  -2.34  _nl0  -. 36*k  .86  .73  .94  _nn6*
t  .69  1.42  -. %o  -. M2  -. D  .37  -. 76  .Q  .07  -. 23  -. 96  -. n*  .66  -2.(2
SO-wr  .56  2.06*  -1.56  .83  -_.3  .nl  .04  .31  -_n6  -. %6  -2.44  -. 07  _ol0  -. 19  1.05  1.26  .74  .0n2
t  1.21  1.79  -. 76  .39  -1.22  .53  .26  .66  -.46  -. 28-  1.15  -. 64  -1.09  -1.22
EL-K,  ispiatimlkg.h,  3514  obwvtlos
IS.ee  dl  foutmlttAs at  tlr  bDttmet  of  Tabte  2  for  explawatlor.
Fl  and F2 exuh his  7  aiid  339  dre  cf  freUxb
VI has  14 mird  '139  d.vars  of  freebbS  6 - bdIvgi.g  ad UW  L5dc.a.dC  at  boom"  to ~mwsuud  U"  ~~  wat.  Porto&
Omtmty  u36  3191  u  L  IP  o3n  KUa  SB  383  3391  uJflP  u231  u13  32m  52  12
_________________hiId031/0  - 00/33/69
116 1.11sum  J02  -01  -b40  .31  -.01  .00  -3LI"  -.33  .JIM  .5  -.. i.  .0*  .00  .06  .01A
.3?  -%I?  %3I  .G?  -1.21  .12  -2.36  -. ?  2.23  1.12  -2.31  .12  .43  .97
am  4 OL.  %II3  J9  .A2  3.23'  .06  MI3  AN  .17  -. 23  -.41  AS  .3  -.O&6  ftO  AX0
.3?  -.63  .2  .3.0  5.32  .60  .01  .56  -. 33  -. 31  .6)  .31  -3.0  .41
EN_I  .16  -3.3  3.3  AO0  -3"9  -.00  -02  .33  .12  .D  -3.47  -.03  -.03  -b10  AS3
.42  3.3  .D  .46  -2.3  -.39  .313  .93  .33  .33  -. O3*  -.2  -3.62  -%82
few5  -.0)  .0  ft03  -.34  AP9  Jo5  -.39  .39  -.3V  -5.34  .29  -.06  -. 00  -.,03  .03D
-. 3  .16  -. ll  -. 5  30  1.25  -'L.3  1.32  -.66  -3.5  .43  -3.45  -.0  -. 2)
____________________ttt~03/03/43  - 0P)3.____________________
mm  6 L3Aim  .40  -J3  -3.3  . . .AM  M  -. 19"  .13  3.Mo"  -.6l  -3.W  .13,  .M  -.06  .03W
3.36  .'.S?  .S  3.06  -.06i  -3.26  -2.3  A4  2.43  -. 36  -3.9  1.92  .73  -.40
cinIOU.  M  -. 5  3?  -. 56  .49  . -.00  -.33  .06  .21  -3.06  -3.35?  .33  .0r"  -. 06  .D
-.49  -%.3  -.34  .32  A4S  -. 0  -. 4.3  .16  .A0  -b63  -5.9  1.32  2.12  -. 0
now  .3  -2.21  -&.5  LS3  -,.47M.0  -.21  -%V  -346  .91  .31  .33  -.33  -%.06VL3I
*A  -3.53  -3.23  206  -2.44  LOS6  -.9?  .-43  -.96  .21  .33  A4?  -3.1?  -.29
m3S  -.03  -. 3)  -.319 -3.0N  .32  LIP  -%II$& -. I  -.41  -t.5  JO7  *06,  A00  --.5?'  .032
-.0  -%S3  -bit3-3.303.92  AD -2346  -. 6  -.7S -3.12  .97  B  A)  .0-2.
_____________tm~lRai  333/S  - t32/3/4
IMM 6 ULf5UZ  -.0  3.5?  -. 6  3.76  -.39  .03  -.22"*  -. 6  .33  UP65  .2  .- ^0  --. 03  .07  .0
-. m)  3.e  .77  2.60  -3.0  I.93  -31.31  -b5  .5  I.9  .35  -.63  -3.3  9
ow4  & OI  -%.D  -. 61  .96  .3?  -.0  .030  IV*6 -.0?  -3.01  L.2613.42"  -%CB  -.05"&  .0  .330
- ~~~~~-3.8  -.43  .31  .56  -. 32MD.33*  2  .- 3.10  .73  MS21-.14  -2.  .43
3mm3  .67  -2.23  .3  -3.92  -.39  -.00  .2  .2  2.42  3*  -4.92  .J6  -.03  -.2S  AS6
2.23  -. X  .3  -3.3  -*W  -3  3.6  .72  1.36  1.36  -5.32  .1)  -.47  -3.36
ICTAIS  .03  -. 0  -.3  .7,  A0  .02"  -.22"  .06  .7?  -3.32  -.30  -.33i  .33  .23  A%
.x.  -. 32  -:'  -. 73  1.34  L.60  -L.2  .3  .79  -. 73  --. 29  -3.0  3.33  2.3
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  - 0631/8
306Ltw2331  -~.v  -. 39  .*  5.0  -.Q3  -. 03  .32  -*M3  A  ftall-.6  -3.36  -.01  A04  ..  03l
-3.36  -3.02  AS  34.3?  -. 63  -3.3  3.4?  -%,a  .0  -. 63  -?.I  -.92  At6  .76
09136  43.  ~~-.2  -.3  3.1.  4.0*  .09  -%On  .01  .3  -.  -.53  -2.5?  .0  .03  J33  .032 .39  -J20  AS3297  LI10-3.07  .33  .?4  -.  -. 9-3.2411.09  J93  .03
32h1  ~~~~-.0  -6)  S.0"  -3.5  -.73  -.05'  .13.36"f  .61  -.6  4.0"  -.59  -.33  -%WA  J063
-. 5  -.28  LO03  -.63  -3.91  -LI29  13.2  2.03  A44  -.23  -. 29  -3.45  -3.24  -%'9
SIms  -.33  .93  %.43.3  33.0  A  %  .3  w  -.03-3.33  -.09  -%OM  -. 0  .052 - -.07~~%~(  a.48  -. 44  13.2  .33  2.31  -. 7  3.33  .33  -. V7-3.32  4.43  -J*  -.79
In thIS  2 for  &ftdtilm  of  vntl*5euFigure  1
Natural  log  of  Industrial  Production
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Natural  Log  of  Industrial  Production
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Exchange  Rate  Movements
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Cocoa  Price  Movements
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Coffee  Price  Movements
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Live  Cattle  Price  Movements
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Orange  Juice  Price  Movements
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Pork  Bellies  Price  Movements
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Sugar  Price  Movements
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Cotton  Price  Movements
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Soybean  Price  Movements
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Soy  Meal  Price  Movements
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Soy  Oil Price  Movements
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Wheat  Price  Movements
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Heating  Oil  Price  Movements
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Gasoline  Price  Movements
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Copper  Price  Movements
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Gold  Price  Movements
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Palladium  Price  Movements
(U.S.  dollars  per  troy  oz.)
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Platinum  Price  Movements
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Silver  Price  Moveements
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